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INTRODUCTION
MARXIST POLITICS, PHILOSOPHY,
AND PEDAGOGY

It is common knowledge that Marx insisted philosophers
should not just interpret the world but change it. Yet many
forget, repress, or bypass (for various material and theoretical reasons) the direction toward which he wanted to change
it, which was inextricably linked with what he studied and
wrote—with marxist theory, in other words. Marx made this
most explicit in a famous 1852 letter to Joseph Weydemeyer, a comrade who emigrated from Germany to the U.S. and
fought in the Union Army against slavery.1 In the letter, Marx
writes that bourgeois theorists before him had discovered the
existence of classes and the class struggle, but that what he
proved was that the class struggle can lead to the dictatorship
1 Throughout this text and others, I don’t capitalize “marxist” to

draw our attention away from the individual Marx and toward the
class struggle of which his work was an expression.
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of the proletariat, and that the “dictatorship [of the proletariat] itself only constitutes the transition to the abolition of all
classes and to a classless society.”2 In 1852 he hadn’t, of course,
discovered the concept that would theoretically arm our class
in this struggle—surplus-value—but the project was consistent throughout his life. It’s a project, however, that today
some—including but not limited to marxist academics—have
abandoned.
As such, it’s helpful to begin with a lesson that Louis Althusser learned from Lenin, that what “a ‘practice’ of philosophy, and the consciousness of what practicing philosophy”
entails is “the consciousness of the ruthless, primary fact that
philosophy divides.”3 The marxist tradition that orders practice above theory is often misunderstood because in marxism
there is no harsh binary between the two—such a binary is idealist. Instead, marxist philosophy begins from everyday practices of production and reproduction or struggle and defeat,
proceeds through conceptual abstraction, before returning to
the real concrete with new thoughts that are hopefully more
correct, which means they will advance the class struggle at a
particular conjuncture.
The class struggle is, crucially, a fight against the capitalist
mode of production and for the communist mode of produc2 Karl Marx, “Marx to Joseph Weydemeyer,” in Marx and Engels

Collected Works (Vol. 39): Letters 1852-1855, ed. J.S. Allen, P.S. Foner,
D.J. Struik, and W.W. Weinstone (London: Lawrence & Wisehart,
1852/2010), 62-65.
3 Louis Althusser, History and Imperialism: Writings, 1963-1986, trans.

G.M. Goshgarian (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2020), 13.
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tion. Althusser tells us that Marx “never provided a true, concise, well thought-out definition of the mode of production.”4
Marx instead offered two definitions. In the chapter on the
labor process, Marx tells us how to distinguish between the
different modes: “It is not the articles made, but how they are
made, and by what instruments.”5 In this definition, a mode
of production is a way of producing articles of utility and is
determined by the means of production. Yet later, Marx writes
that production on an expanded scale “does not present itself
as accumulation of capital, nor as the function of a capitalist, so long as the labourer’s means of production, and with
them, his product and means of subsistence, do not confront
him in the shape of capital.”6 Here the mode of production
refers to “the way of producing in the social sense,” which is
“the whole process of production and reproduction.”7 Put another
way, a mode of production is about the means of production
and the relations of production; both of which constitute the
economic “base” of society. The relations of production are
who produces, under what conditions, and how they relate to
each other and—under capitalism—how they relate to those
who do not produce but own. A mode of production, then,
is not defined by legal or technical relations (even if it’s par4 Althusser, History and Imperialism, 67.
5 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy (Vol. 1): The

Process of Capitalist Production, trans. S. Moore and E. Aveling (New
York: International Publishers, 1867/1967), 175.
6 Ibid., 560.
7 Althusser, History and Imperialism, 68.
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tially maintained through them) and is instead the unity of
both the means and relations of production but—and this
is an important but—“under the dominance of the relations of
production.”8
For Marx, the capitalist mode of production became dominant once it passed from formal subjection to real subjection.
Capital at first merely takes the labor processes of handicraft
and manufacture as it finds them (in England) and takes command over them by, for example, lengthening the working day.
At this point capital has not yet acquired the direct control
of the labour process insofar as the regulating mechanism of
production is the worker who necessarily “maintains some autonomy from capital.”9 Real subjection takes place when “industries that have been taken over” by capital “continue to be
revolutionised by changes in the methods of production.”10
Real subjection takes place when capital replaces living labor
as the motor of production with dead labor, or machinery. As
a result, capital’s command over labor increases and intensifies, as the knowledge of the production process is objectified in machinery and technology and withheld from our class
through the state’s repressive apparatuses. Here, we see the
two definitions of the mode of production in their unity: the
means of production and the relations of production define
capitalism, which comes into its own through real subjection.
8 Ibid., 69.
9 Curry Malott, “Capitalism, Crisis, and Educational Struggle in

the Postdigital,” Postdigital Science and Education 1, no. 2 (2019): 376.
10 Marx, Capital (Vol. 1), 478.
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Machinery, once it fully replaces the workers’ tools, transforms the worker “into a fragment of a man,” and “degrade[s]
him to the level of an appendage of a machine.”11 Thus, not
only the relations of production are changed but so too is the
subjectivity of workers. At the same time, however, the figure of
the collective worker is solidified. Guido Starosta goes so far as
to claim that “large-scale industry begets, as its most genuine
product, a universal worker, that is, a productive subject capable
of taking part in any form of the human labour-process.”12
There is, as such, a contradictory process of subjectivation
happening in which workers are both atomized and subjected
to machinery while at the same time uniting to form a class.
Our class is, in turn, constantly decomposed and recomposed through the absolute general law of capitalism, the result
of which is a dynamic and ever-expanding industrial reserve
army produced through technological developments.13
The industrial factory is thus a dialectical sublation, which
is especially apparent given that it is precisely the proletarians’
skills and knowledges that are objectified in machinery. The
11 Ibid., 604.
12 Guido Starosta, “The System of Machinery and Determina-

tions of Revolutionary Subjectivity in the Grundrisse and Capital,”
in In Marx’s Laboratory: Critical Interpretations of the Grundrisse, ed. R.
Bellofiore, G. Starosta, and P.D. Thomas (Rotterdam: Brill, 2013),
239.
13 This is distinguished from the “absolute law” of capitalist ac-

cumulation, which is the production of surplus value. Further, it is
“like all other laws… modified in its working by many circumstances.” See Marx, Capital (Vol. 1), 603, emphasis added.
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proletarian, however, constitutes anyone subjected to capital,
whether they’re employed or not, whether they work for a
wage or not, whether they produce a good or a service, whether they are in the city or the countryside, or the Global North
or South. While at one point in Capital Marx defines the “productive worker” as one directly engaged in producing surplus
value—and says it is a “misfortune,” he later writes that “the
maintenance and reproduction of the working-class is, and
must ever be, a necessary condition to the reproduction of
capital.”14 Surplus value is not just produced but has to be
transported, exchanged, and realized or consumed. Proletarian is both an adjective and a verb, it’s a process: the proletarianization of increasing numbers of people and communities,
states, and nations, is precisely the process of capitalist production.
Wherever one falls in the ongoing process of proletarianization, one is part of this class from which capital expropriates land, subjectivity, knowledges, and skills.15 One of the
most interesting and potent examples is the cotton gin, an
invention credited to Eli Whitney, something of a folk hero in
the U.S. elementary school curriculum. Sam Marcy, however,
argues that “the first gin made in Mississippi was constructed
based on a crude drawing by a skilled slave,” and becase “the
slaves were never recognized in law as persons, the slave owners could appropriate their property as well as any inventions
14 Marx, Capital (Vol. 1), 477, 537.
15 It’s worth emphasizing that Marx noted that workers’ lives are

made “the more precarious” as a result of proletarianization, so the
figure of the ‘precariat’ is nothing new. See Ibid., 603.
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they might conceive of.”16 The impetus for the invention was
the increased demand for cotton in England as a result of the
industrial revolution. Capitalism intensified the barbarism of
slavery and immiserated the English proletariat at the same
time. Even under capitalism, in which the “individual” enters
into a “contract” with a capitalist as free equals in juridical
terms, proletarian knowledge forms key ingredients or blueprints for “capital’s” technological transformations.
Here we see a rich dialectic unfold devoid of any traces
of technological determinism. In his latest book, Andy Merrifield extrapolates on the fourth footnote in the chapter on
machinery and modern industry in Capital, where Marx articulates his dialectical and historical-materialist approach to
technology. “Humans make machines,” he begins, “develop
technology from bright ideas,” which, in turn:
emerge out of prevailing material circumstances. Yet as
soon as those bright ideas are realized materially, get embodied in new technology, in new machinery, they react,
help shape us in dramatically ambivalent ways. We make
technology; technology remakes us. Technology changes
prevailing ideas, too, which then open further possibilities for the development of other new ideas and add
other new technological advancements.17
16 Sam Marcy, High Tech, Low Pay: A Marxist Analysis of the Chang-

ing Character of the Working Class (New York: World View Forum,
2009), 59.

17 Andy Merrifield, Marx Dead and Alive: Reading Capital in Precari-

ous Times (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2020), 63.
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The questions, of course, are whether and on what
grounds these are technological advancements or merely technological changes. Yet the point stands: ideas, social relations, the
mode of production, and the means of production exist in a
dialectical relationship, with each impacting the others. This is
consistent with marxist theory, that philosophy cannot be understood without historical, political, sociological, economic,
and other forms of inquiry and practice, including education
and pedagogy. 18
Much marxist educational theory has primarily concerned
itself with critiquing the structures, systems, and curricula of
schooling rather than delving deeply into educational philosophy and pedagogy. The former concerns the content of education while pedagogy concerns the relation to the content; or
the former concerns the what while the latter concerns the how.
Of course, it is necessary to have an adequate political and
ideological framework to engage in marxist education; yet this
alone is insufficient. Pedagogy—as an educational methodology—has to be held in tension with political commitments.
Both, of course, are guided by the practical concerns of the
workers’ movement historically and today, as well as by their
potential future trajectories, potential trajectories that are immanent in the present.
It is this task which the essays in this book attempt to
pursue. What this book is concerned with, to put it differently, is the articulation of the political contexts and the peda18 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology: Part One,

with Selections from Parts Two and Three and Supplementary Texts, trans.
C.J. Arthur (New York: International Publishers, 1932/1970).
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gogical philosophies and practices of marxist education. The
navigation between the two tasks is premised on what might
be the most general marxist philosophy of education there
is: the presumption of competence. Marxism is a theory for
understanding and intervening in the world and is accordingly
predicated on the ability of the working and oppressed classes
to not only understand the world but take the power necessary
to transform it in a communist direction. This is why Marx,
Engels, Lenin, and others constantly decried socialists who
“belittled” or “talked down” to workers.19 If one does not
think the masses are capable of knowing and acting, then why
engage in revolutionary struggle at all?
Elements for Marxist Pedagogy
Interestingly, in the index of International Publishers edition
of the first volume of Marx’s Capital—the edition and translation prepared and approved by Progress Publishers, one of
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union’s publishing houses—there are no pages dedicated to the entry “mode of production.” The index entry for “mode of production” points
19 See Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, “Marx and Engels to

August Bebel, Wilhelm Liebknecht, Wilhelm Bracke and Others
(Circular Letter),” trans. P. Ross and B. Ross, in Marx and Engels
Collected Works (Vol. 45): Letters 1874-79, ed. J.S. Allen, P.S. Foner,
D.J. Struik, and W.W. Weinstone (London: Lawrence & Wisehart,
1879/2010); V.I. Lenin, “What is to be Done?” in Essential Works of
Lenin, ed. H.M. Christman (New York: Dover Publications, 1987);
and for more on Lyotard and the communist project, see Derek R.
Ford, Communist Study: Education for the Commons, 2nd. ed. (Lanham:
Lexington Books, 2021), 121-134.
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you to “socio-economic formation.” My speculation is that
they wanted first to underscore that any mode of production
is not just economic but social, but moreover to emphasize—
as Marx did—that every socio-economic formation consisted of multiple modes of production. In the preface to the
first German edition of Capital, for example, Marx justified
his focus on England on the basis that it was where the capitalist mode of production was most developed but noted that
“alongside of modern evils” of capitalism, “a whole series of
inherited evils oppress us, arising from the passive survival of
antiquated modes of production.”20 In fact, the very first sentence of the book contains a key qualifier that’s often glossed
over. “The wealth of those societies,” Marx writes, “in which
the capitalist mode of production prevails, presents itself as ‘an
immense accumulation of commodities.’”21 While it’s often
noted that wealth is not commodities but only appears as such,
what is less remarked is that the capitalist mode of production
only prevails; it is not exclusive.
Even capitalism, for Marx, was not universalizing or totalizing. Marx saw capitalism as “housing” “a vast, heterogeneous inventory and ‘conjuncture’ of temporalities no longer
stigmatized for having been cast out of time but rather as expressions of contretemps, simultaneous nonsimultaneities…
contemporaneous noncontemporaneities or uneven times,

20 Marx, Capital (Vol. 1), 20.
21 Ibid., 43, emphasis added.
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and zeitwidrig, time’s turmoil, times out of joint.”22 Nothing
perhaps reveals Marx’s temporal openness more than his suggestion that surviving communes in 19th century Russia were
progressive relative to capitalism. Particularly in the Grundrisse,
Marx “rejected any linear causality that envisaged a singularly
progressive movement from one period or mode of production to the next… but rather saw the multilinear movements
as taking place in different regions and among diverse peoples.”23 Thinkers in the Global South and elsewhere latched
onto and developed such insights. To give just one example,
Mariátegui’s historical account of Peru accounted for indigenous communities, forms of common ownership or cultivation, Spanish colonial feudalism, and a republican capitalism.
This was made possible exactly “because Marxism was open
to diverse regional historical experiences that historical materialism had to account for, instead of remaining narrowly
constrained by a singular and singularizing dogmatic discourse
applied to all situations.”24 Unfortunately, Western marxism,
including educational marxism, has often neglected Marx’s
complex conception of time and history. It is within such a
heterogeneous complex of any given social formation that a
new mode of production can arise.
I see the pedagogy that advances the class struggle in our
social formation as a pedagogy of the encounter. Capitalism
22 Harry Harootunian, Marx After Marx: History and Time in the

Expansion of Capitalism (New York: Columbia University Press,
2015), 23.
23 Ibid., 48.
24 Ibid., 140.
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itself, after all, “sprung from a historic ‘encounter’” between the
capitalist and the wage worker and “the proof is that it is
highly likely… that the capitalist mode of production was born and
died several times in history before becoming viable.”25 Perhaps
the first place to begin, then, is with Althusser, who always
found Marx’s work a rich source for study precisely as a result
of its openness, its silences, its doubleness, and its contingency.
While this is most explicit in his writing on the encounter,
G.M. Goshgarian has shown that it’s a continual theme from
his first book, For Marx. It’s in his posthumously published
manuscript, “The Underground Current of the Materialism
of the Encounter,” however, where it is explored in most
length.26 Althusser begins the piece like Lucretius Carus who,
writing about Epicurus, produced the poem “On the Nature
of Things,” which “says that, before the beginning of the
world, the atoms were ‘falling like rain’. This would have gone
on indefinitely, had the atoms not been endowed with an astonishing property, ‘declination’, the capacity to deviate from
the straight line of their fall.”27 Althusser begins his piece on
the encounter by writing, “It is raining. Let this book therefore

25 Louis Althusser, Philosophy for Non-Philosophers, trans. G.M.

Goshgarian (London: Bloomsbury, 2017), 134, 135, emphasis in
original.
26 G.M. Goshgarian, “The Void of the Forms of Historicity as

Such,” Rethinking Marxism 31, no. 3 (2019): 243-272.

27 Althusser, Philosophy for Non-Philosophers, 29, emphasis in original.
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be, before all else, a book about ordinary rain.”28 The materialism of the encounter is a historical materialism, a kind of
riff on Marx and Engels’ own, one that is true to their lineage
in that it privileges contingency over necessity, chance over
predictability.
Atoms fell parallel until there was a swerve, a clinamen, or
“the slightest ‘deviance” being “enough for the atoms to encounter each other and agglomerate.”29 For Epicurus, it is not that
before the world there was nothing; in fact, before the world
there was something: materiality. Yet the encountering—and
more precisely, the piling up of encounters, the “taking hold”
of enough encounters, produces a historic event. The atoms
clashed, and enough encounters took hold that they created
a world.
There is no reason to explore any origins; just the fact that
the swerve happened. Each element itself is autonomous and
conjunctural, which is why they “‘conjoin’ by ‘taking hold’ in
a new structure.”30 The communist revolution is such a piling
up of encounters of elements that “exist in history in a ‘floating’
state prior to their ‘accumulation and ‘combination.’”31 “The
forms in which communist elements appear in capitalist society,” Althusser writes elsewhere, “are countless. Marx himself
names a whole series of them, from forms of children’s edu28 Louis Althusser, Philosophy of the Encounter: Later Writings, 1978-

1987, trans. G.M. Goshgarian (New York: Verso, 2006), 167.
29 Althusser, Philosophy for Non-Philosophers, 29.
30 Althusser, History and Imperialism, 33.
31 Louis Althusser, Philosophy of the Encounter, 198.
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cation combining work and schooling,” “the proletarian community of life and struggle,” “joint-stock companies,” and so
on, to say nothing of the ‘socialization of production.’”32 Yet
these are “elements for communism,” elements that communism will sublate, modify, adapt, and so on. There is no guarantee they will take hold, but particular pedagogical forms and
practices might help them do so.
The pedagogical encounter is “an exposure to an outside,” and an excess or surplus gap within the lesson. As a
result, pedagogical encounters cannot “be brought about by
learning theory or the expertise of the teacher,” but “rather
happen when a certain configuration of institutional and extrainstitutional forces come into play.”33 For Tyson E. Lewis,
the educational space of the encounter is the seminar, which
allows for “a moment of disinterpellation through which students, materials (books, essays, films, and so forth), and the
teacher enter into a constellation of forces that destabilize
and thus open up a space and a time wherein a new kind of
educational life beyond the subject temporarily forms.”34 The
seminar is where teachers, students, and objects take up and
produce spaces—sonically, visually, kinesthetically. Whereas
interpellation brings the subject into the existing world and
counterinterpellation pushes back against that world, disinterpellation suspends and opens the world, allowing for the
32 Althusser, History and Imperialism, 64.
33 Tyson E. Lewis, “A Marxist Education of the Encounter:

Althusser, Interpellation, and the Seminar,” Rethinking Marxism 29,
no. 2 (2017): 314.
34 Ibid., 316.
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encounter. Disinterpellation “makes the subject unfamiliar to
itself and thus open to its own dissolution through the encounter with an outside. Since the swerve of the encounter is
never predictable and never reducible to the logic of learning
a specific lesson of the teacher.”35
There is no lesson learned nor is any lesson taught. Rather
than the transmission of knowledge there’s the transmission of
affects. “The origin of transmitted affects,” Teresa Brennan remarks, “is social in that these affects do not only arise within a
particular person but also come via an interaction with other
people and an environment. By the transmission of affect, I
mean simply that the emotions or affects of one person, and
the enhancing or depressing energies these affects entail, can
enter into another.”36 As an affective experience, disinterpellation disobeys the boundaries between the abstracted included
and excluded subjects of education, allowing us to encounter
elements that can work against the abstraction of capitalism
and help us experience the communist future in the present
so that we may work toward creating more encounters and,
ultimately, a revolutionary rupture.
The entire marxist project is to work towards the building up of encounters and differentializations by advancing the
class struggle to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat
and ultimately create a classless society without capitalist abstraction. As Marx and Engels tell us in The German Ideology,
“communism is for us not a state of affairs which is to be es35 Ibid., 317.
36 Teresa Brennan, The Transmission of Affect (Ithaca: Cornell Uni-

versity Press, 2004), 3.
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tablished, an ideal to which reality [will] have to adjust itself,”
and is instead “the real movement which abolishes the present
state of this.” Moreover, “the conditions of this movement
result from the premises now in existence.”37 In sum, the pages that follow enunciate the premises now in existence and
propose pedagogical responses for assembling such encounters so that, with the guidance of working-class organization,
they can take hold, as they have started to with such tremendous (and detrimental) results in the past.

37 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology: Part One,

with Selections from Parts Two and Three and Supplementary Texts, trans.
C.J. Arthur (New York: International Publishers, 1970), 56-57.
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1
MARX’S PEDAGOGICAL CONSTELLATION:
INQUIRY AND PRESENTATION

While Marx considered education at times, he never explicitly
addressed pedagogy. One possible exception is in the 1872
preface to the French edition of Capital, which was to be published in serial format. Marx is fearful “that the French public… eager to know the connexion between general principles
and the immediate questions that have aroused their passions,
may be disheartened because they will be unable to move on
at once.”1 The pedagogical problem concerns the unity of
theory and practice, and Marx does not pose a pedagogical response, but a pedagogical warning: “There is no royal road to
science, and only those who do not dread the fatiguing climb
of its steep paths have a chance of gaining its luminous sum-

1 Marx, Capital (Vol. 1), 30.
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mits.”2 As Tyson Lewis argues, this is ultimately a non-answer,
as “the difficult labor of the concept [pedagogy] is largely left
to the intellectual labor of the workers themselves.”3 Following Althusser, Lewis argues that there’s a lag between marxist
philosophy and marxist pedagogy.
Yet Marx actually poses a pedagogical framework the very
next year, in his 1873 afterword to the second German edition of Capital, where he distinguishes the Forschung from the
Darstellung, or the method of inquiry from that of presentation. Here Marx is responding to an assessment of Capital that
appeared in an 1872 edition of the European Messenger based
in St. Petersburg. The assessment focuses on Marx’s method
of presentation and commends Marx for showing the laws
of capitalism and of social transformation. Marx claims this
is ultimately an affirmation of his anti-Hegelian dialectic, but
before clarifying his dialectic, he briefly notes the necessary
differences between inquiry and formulation, a difference I
take as pedagogical. “Of course,” Marx writes, “the method
of presentation must differ in form from that of inquiry.” Inquiry, or studying, “has to appropriate the material in detail, to
analyse its different forms of development, to trace out their
inner connexion.” The method of presentation, or learning,
occurs only after this is accomplished. “Only after this work
is done,” he says, “can the actual movement be adequately

2 Tyson Lewis, “The Pedagogical Unconscious: Rethinking Marx-

ist Pedagogy through Louis Althusser and Fredric Jameson,” Journal
for Critical Education Policy Studies 3, no. 2 (2005): 145.
3 Ibid.

MARX’S PEDAGOGICAL CONSTELLATION

19

described.”4 I think Marx is describing two different pedagogies—or educational processes or logics—here. In particular,
the method of inquiry (or research) is akin to studying while
the method of presentation is akin to learning.
Learning is guided by pre-determined ends, upholds binary distinctions between ignorance and intelligence, amateurism and professionalism, students and teachers, and so
on. Learning is a developmental process that moves from
the former to the latter by various means (constructivist, student-centered, dialogical, etc.). It is about the actualization of
a pre-existing potential. Only on this basis can learning be
measured, quantified, and assessed. Learning is attached to
productivity, to “immediate utility in daily life,” and “is more
or less a linear process that unfolds chronologically toward
maximum outputs.”5 The ontology of learning is the endless
progression from impotentiality to potentiality, or from the
state of “I cannot” to “I can.”6 Marx, indeed, wanted readers
to learn from his presentation about the dynamics of capital,
its contradictions, histories, potential futures, and fault lines to
better intervene in the class struggle.
Studying, on the other hand, encompasses various practices that interrupt, delay, and deactivate learning. While studying,
one might have a pre-determined end goal in mind, but that
4 Marx, Capital (Vol. 1), 28.
5 Tyson E. Lewis and Daniel Friedrich, “Educational States of

Suspension,” Educational Philosophy and Theory 48, no. 3 (2016): 237,
238.
6 See Tyson E. Lewis, On Study: Giorgio Agamben and Educational

Potentiality (New York: Routledge, 2013).
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is quickly suspended as the studier finds themselves lost, wandering, and straying in unpredictable and unforeseeable ways.
In essence, studying is a pedagogical style that renders existing
and foreordained ways of being inoperative and, by doing so,
it opens up the possibilities of what can be as the dictates
of what is are suspended. As one example, Lewis and Friedrich propose tinkering as a form of studying. While tinkering,
the student frees an object or process from any foreordained
ends and “the instrumentality” of learning “and the success
conditions determining proper vs. improper, success vs. failure are suspended indefinitely.”7 Or, as Weili Zhao succinctly
phrases it, the “studier is supposed to forget-suspend its presuppositions and identities, ready to be ex-posed to some signatures hidden sporadically between the lines, evoked to what
is unsaid or unresolved aporia, and/or provoked to elaborate
the unsaid/aporia toward generating new possibilities.”8 The
ontology of studying, to phrase it differently, is a fluctuation
between the two states, an immersion in suspension between
different methods, sources, and potential outcomes.
The method of inquiry is one that examines material in
all of its nuances and relationships, tracing out the different
lineages, past, present, and future potential forms of development, and how they each interdepend on and transform
each other. As Marx put it in his 1857 Introduction, you move
7 Lewis and Friedrich, “Educational States of Suspension,” 240.
8 Weili Zhao, “Calibrating Study and Learning as Hermeneutic

Principles through Greco-Christian Seeing, Rabbinic Hearing, and
Chinese Yijing Observing,” Studies in Philosophy and Education 39, no.
3 (2020): 322.
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from the world as it is—in our “chaotic conception… of the
whole” to transition “from the imagined concrete towards
ever thinner abstractions.” Yet “from there the journey would
have to be retraced” so that the world in its concreteness is “a
rich totality of many determinations and relations.”9 This is
the pedagogy of inquiry or studying. Such a pedagogy entails
wandering around, looking for connections, developing and
proposing abstractions and determinations, thinking you are
onto something and then following it to a dead end, generating ideas, getting lost in the archives (or on YouTube or the
internet), journeying out and wandering or wondering around.
When Marx was studying, he had an end in mind: he wanted
to understand the inner logics and dynamics of capital, how
these came to be, what impact they had and might have on the
world, and how the contradictions can be seized upon during
the class struggle.
Only once you’ve adequately done this can you turn to
presenting your findings. The presentation takes a totally different form. It begins with conceptual building blocks and proceeds linearly in a developmental manner. This is why Marx,
in Capital, often casts aside the historical origins of British
capital, the question of rent and finance, and so on. On first
glance, it seems that Capital is exclusively a pedagogy of learning that begins with something simple and obvious (the commodity) and then goes deeper and deeper until we see that this
“trivial” appearing thing is a series of ongoing struggles: be9 Karl Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political

Economy (Rough Draft), trans. M. Nicolaus (New York: Penguin,
1939/1993), 100.
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tween and within classes and the state that play out differently
over history, that assume different forms (like technology and
machinery), and so on. But first, we have to get the concept
of surplus-value before any of this makes sense, and in order
to do that, we have to get to the basics of commodities, their
two-fold nature, circulation, money, and so on. Learning or
presentation is a developmental process that is more or less
linear, advancing from the partial to the complete so that if
“done successfully… it may appear as if we had before us a
mere a priori construction.”10
While Marx insists that only after studying is completed
can the work be presented, this does not mean that the two
pedagogies are linearly joined, so that studying must lead to
learning. Yet the opposition is not as clear-cut as he makes it
appear in the afterword. Ultimately, it is only after learning to
read a text that one can study it; meanwhile, studying leaves
traces in the product of learning. Both learning and studying
are heterogeneously blocked together, and the task of marxist education is to facilitate the movement between the two.
While Marx wanted workers to learn from his presentation,
he knew he could not finish such a project, as no one can
fully delineate and learn about capitalism so long as it exists,
as capital is by definition a dynamic social relation. Andy Merrifield’s recent reading of Capital seems to affirm this. Merrifield writes that “Marx never wanted to finish Capital because
he could not see how it could ever be finished. He sought
the definitive but knew the impossibility of the definitive. It

10 Marx, Capital (Vol. 1), 28.
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tormented him.”11 Indeed, when one reads the various outlines that Marx presented for Capital in the Grundrisse and elsewhere, it is clear that Marx was taking on a project he knew he
could never finish.
He wanted to write volumes on the state, the world market, foreign trade, wages, the history of theory, and more.
Even in the first volume of Capital, we see traces of Marx’s
interminable studying in the various places he notes an absolutely crucial point—one we must understand—only to move
on and say he cannot address it here and it will have to wait
until later, until he’s returned to studying. Sometimes, like
when he brings up credit and rent in volume 1, he does return
in volume 3. But other times, like when he brings up violations
of the ideal law of exchanges, he never goes back, because, as
a pedagogical text, Capital is more developmental.
As a result, Marx’s pedagogies of learning and studying
should be seen as constellations. Drawing on Walter Benjamin,
Lewis maps out educational marxisms and contends that we
should neither defend one at the expense of another nor put
them as dots on a timeline unfolding into a completed dialectic synthesis or “final Marxist ‘solution.’” Instead, he argues
we should approach them as constellations, which do not “resolve tensions within and between competing theories” and
instead finds “that such tensions are productive indexes that
both connect and disconnect singular theoretical registers.”12
Marx’s pedagogical methods—deployed while writing and re11 Merrifield, Marx Dead and Alive, 15.
12 Tyson E. Lewis, “Mapping the Constellation of Educational
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searching—are best viewed in this way, as “hang[ing] precariously together, maintaining an absent center.”13 It is not that
one subsumes the other or that they eventually transcend their
differences in unity.
There is a dialectical relationship between inquiry and
presentation. It may be that the relationship between the
two is ultimately contingent upon a variety of factors, from
the dominant mode of production to the state of the class
struggle. In fact, as Althusser writes, Marx was only able to
write Capital owing to his own experiences in the workers’
movement. Marx claimed he wasn’t a marxist to reject “the
idea, ‘obvious’ to everyone at the time, that he, the individual Marx, the intellectual Marx, could be the intellectual or
even political author… For it was the real—the workers’ class
struggle—which acted as the true author (the agent).”14 This
is what Marx means when he writes that critical science can
only be done by the proletarian class: it is not Marx but the
class struggle that theorizes and, as such, cannot but do so
in a strictly partisan manner. The movement is guided by the
educational philosophy of the workers’ movement itself, for
“the union of theory and practice implies that every political
practice contains a philosophy, while every philosophy contains a practical signification, a politics.”15 This is the task of
the workers’ organization, the Communist Party.
13 Ibid., 112.
14 Louis Althusser, Philosophy of the Encounter, 18.
15 Louis Althusser, The Humanist Controversy and Other Writings, ed.
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Marx engaged in and performed both pedagogical logics,
but in distinct ways at different times, sometimes as an intentional tactic and other times as a contingency of the workers’ struggle. In this chapter, I turn to Althusser and Antonio
Negri’s readings of Marx’s writing to excavate his own navigational process, and I do this by focusing on the Grundrisse
and Capital and showing how Marx’s own distinction between
inquiry and presentation is not so rigid and, as a result, those who
argue in favor of one book over the other do so because they
fail to recognize his pedagogical tact. I follow Althusser’s notion that “there is no such thing as an innocent reading,” and
that neither Marx, the interpretations engaged here, nor those
that I develop here, are objective or neutral.16
My intention in this chapter is not to defend one reading
against another or to say one is a ‘correct’ versus an ‘incorrect’
interpretation of Marx. I wager that the different presentations are legitimate and productive for the communist struggle. Such a wager, however, is contingent upon an appreciation of Marx’s pedagogy, and in particular, his heterogenous
blocking together of learning and studying. In other words,
the absent pedagogical problematic in both Althusser and Negri underlies the apparent antagonism of their readings. To
be faithful to Marx is to learn and study works of Marx’s
and his interpreters—and most importantly the ongoing history of the international struggle of working and oppressed
peoples—in order to organize and prepare for a revolution16 Louis Althusser, “From Capital to Marx’s Philosophy,” in L.

Althusser, É. Balibar, R. Establet, P. Macherey, and J. Rancière,
Reading Capital, trans. B. Brewster and D. Fernbach (New York:
Verso, 1965/2015), 12.
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ary rupture and build the dictatorship of the proletariat. This
does not mean there is the absence of polemical debates but
rather that such debates are based on revolutionary optimism.
In order to make the strategic shifts and tactical alliances necessary to advance the class struggle, we should maintain the
flexibility that constellational thinking allows.
From the Grundrisse to Capital
Marx’s Grundrisse, a series of notes Marx wrote in the frantic
days of 1857-1858, is seen by some as preparatory research
for his magnum opus, Capital, especially the first volume, the
only one published (and republished) during Marx’s lifetime.
For Louis Althusser, it is the latter work that constitutes the
one text by which “Marx has to be judged.”17 For others, the
notebooks represent a work of Marx in their own right, one
that’s distinct from and even superior to Capital. Antonio Negri, for example, understands the Grundrisse as an explicitly
political text, a more marxist text than Capital precisely due to
its “incredible openness” and its emphasis on antagonistic
subjectivity.”18 Capital, according to Negri, is not only fragmentary but closed, determinate, and objective, a book where
antagonisms are resolved dialectically, foreclosing the subjective rupture that the communist revolution requires. Others
insist that we read them together, not necessarily to provide a
17 Louis Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, trans. B.

Brewster (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), 45.

18 Antonio Negri, Marx beyond Marx: Lessons on the Grundrisse,

trans. H. Cleaver, M. Ryan, and M. Viano (Brooklyn: Autonomedia,
1979/1991), 9.
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final or perfect account of marxism, but rather because such
a co-reading generates new insights. Taken together, both
present different—but not contradictory—aspects of capital’s contemporary forms of exploitation and of proletarian
forms of resistance.
Marx’s pedagogical gestures here testify to the necessity
of both educational praxes. Importantly, however, his movements between learning and studying, while sometimes tactical
decisions, were not dictated by some inner genius but by the
twists and turns of the workers’ movement and, undoubtedly, his own health. Marx’s serious study of political economy
began after the failure of the 1848 bourgeois-democratic revolutions, after which he was exiled to London. He did not see
another uprising on the agenda, and so he set to work studying and writing. While he initially introduced his own political
and economic categories with The German Ideology, his serious
study did not begin until much later, in the early 1850s. But
when another uprising happened, like the Paris Commune,
Marx turned to examine that instead of continuing work on
Capital. He pushed the publication of volume 2, as he wanted
to see how the early 1870s economic crisis turned out.
Marx’s notes that were eventually published as the Grundrisse were penned during the financial crisis of 1856-7, a crisis
that spurred Marx on a frenzy of study. He had a clear goal
in mind: to articulate the inner logics and dynamics of capitalism, to critique bourgeois political economy, to lay out a
method, and to identify what contradictions could galvanize
the revolution. But they were a series of notes, abandoned
by Marx and only published first in 1939 in the Soviet Union
and made available in Europe and the U.S. during the 1960s
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and 1970s. As notes, they’re traces of studying, and because we
read Marx studying—that is, producing, following, wondering
about, and sometimes losing—concepts as he goes, we can
“follow Marx while he is actually thinking.”19
Negri’s 1978 Paris lectures on the Grundrisse, delivered at
the invitation of Louis Althusser, represent the most partisan
approach to the book. It’s not that Negri dismisses Capital,
of course, but that he emphasizes the book only represents
one aspect of marxism. The Grundrisse is an endless unfolding
of antagonisms of revolutionary subjectivity. Capital, on the
contrary, is more limited precisely because of its “categorical
presentation.”20 Pedagogically speaking, the Grundrisse’s traces
of studying open more prospects for revolution that the developmental learning of Capital closes down. The difference
turns on antagonism and dialectics. The Grundrisse proceeds by
way of antagonism, whereas Capital proceeds by way of dialectics (which Negri claims are closed and formulaic). Yet the
dialectic for Marx is absolutely crucial in both Capital and the
Grundrisse. At the same time, the pedagogical dialectic between
learning and studying, for Negri, is incorrectly applied politically in Capital because of its privileging of presentation and
learning, while the Grundrisse is a text of studying that includes
learning but prioritizes the class struggle, or the pedagogical
form of the Grundrisse is “open on all sides: every conclusion
that takes the form of a presentation of the research opens
19 Eric J. Hobsbawm, “Introduction,” in K. Marx, Pre-Capitalist

Economic Foundations, ed. E.J. Hobsbawm, trans. J. Cohen (New
York: International Publishers, 1964), 64.
20 Negri, Marx Beyond Marx, 8.
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spaces to new research and new presentation.”21 The text is
one in which “the objective analysis of capital and the subjective analysis of class behavior come together, where class
hatred permeates his science.”22 Capital, he claims, leaves “no
possibility, even in the form of a paradox, of the dynamism
of this process by hypostatizing it, by rigidifying it,” while “the
originality, the happiness, the freshness of the Grundrisse rest
entirely with its incredible openness.”23 The contradictions of
capitalism developed in Capital are replaced in the Grundrisse
with antagonism and subjectivity.
The pedagogical form of the Grundrisse, even the presentation or linearity of the logic, is a linearity of presentation, but one
determined by “a class logic that governs this angle of attack of exposition.”24 The inquiry and presentation of capital are both the
antagonism of classes and the differential production of subjectivity. Yet the motor of difference is based on antagonism
and the presentation of the theoretical process of inquiry is
“a whole series of operations of the displacement of the subject
and the dislocation of the theoretical field.”25 This is because
“class struggle does not know synthesis, it only knows victories and defeats.”26 It’s a collective knowledge of wins and
21 Ibid., 12.
22 Ibid., 9.
23 Ibid., 61.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid., 77.
26 Ibid., 76.
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losses, advances and retreats, which means that Marx’s method opens the path to a theory of surplus-value, which is not
a linear intellectual unfolding of developmental learning but
rather a studying that shifts subjectively and structurally.
Unlike presentation and learning, reality itself “is not linear” but is rather “transformed continually” as it “draws into
its movement the antagonism of collective forces that knowingly exercise power,” reality and history continually move
the horizon of research. Rather than developmental learning,
it’s a studying defined by “a qualitative leap,” by “collective
relations of force” and is thus “not skeptical, but dynamic
and creative.”27 As surplus-value is the essence of capital,
this means that capital itself is subjectivity. There is no predetermination, no evolution or unraveling; only a process of
studying animated by the indeterminacy and unpredictability
of the class struggle. Through disruption and subversion—in
thought and practice, in the mind and flesh—new real categories are born and new antagonisms are animated. Negri
refers to this as a process of constitution, one that results from
antagonistic struggles by different and oppositional subjective
forces and that moves from “the relation between the use value of
abstract knowledge and the need for a transformation of knowledge.”28
Such a transformation is the production of reality.		
In sum, for Negri what is important in the Grundrisse is
not so much the formulation of new categories and concepts,

27 Ibid., 56.
28 Ibid., 47.
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but rather “the definition of social antagonism.”29 The pedagogy
that dominates the Grundrisse, in this reading, is one of relentless studying organized around and for communism. Yet
it advances, retreats, and suspends the developmental learning at
work in the book. In fact, the two pedagogies are constellated
together. Marx does not finalize one aspect of research and
move to the next logical one. Instead, each inquiry uncovers
a distinct antagonistic subjectivity and struggle, which renews
and compels the formulation of categories and concepts,
until the next antagonism displaces the field of studying and
learning altogether. Learning here is subordinated to studying
insofar as the presentation itself structures and produces antagonism. Whereas the knowledge presented in Capital is fixed
and rigid, for Negri, the knowledge of the Grundrisse is open
and indeterminate.
The Pedagogies of Capital
While Althusser finds that the texts later compiled as the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 were totally idealist, he still sees the transitional works “like The German Ideology, or even the Grundrisse” as “very ambiguous,” too Hegelian
and thus not marxist in their theory, science, philosophy, or
praxis.30 The epistemological break or rupture he justifies in
For Marx happens as clarity overtakes ambiguity. The break is
two-fold: it entails “founding the theory of history (historical
materialism)” as well as producing “a new philosophy (dialectical materialism)” that happened when he “broke with his
29 Ibid., 187.
30 Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, 45.
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erstwhile ideological philosophy.”31 In his later work “Marx in
his Limits” Althusser says the labeling was imprudent but it
still rings true. It does so not because of Marx’s intellect but
as a result of Marx’s participation in the organizations and
parties of the class, especially the First International, in that
these themselves produced the rupture he would later write as
Capital.32 Earlier, Althusser conceived it as a break that Marx
himself produced that emphasizes clarity.
In his contribution to Reading Capital, Althusser focuses on
the scientific nature of Capital, and how its new epistemology
and framework changes the world (and the word). Althusser
articulates, in content and form, the pedagogical and political modes of engaging Capital. He presents this through two
forms of reading-writing. He begins by noting that the book is
a series of lecture notes from a class in 1965, which have not
been edited to create (the illusion of ?) a completed work, and instead remain “the mere beginnings of a reading,” which therefore retain “their rhythm, their didactic or oral style, but also
and above all in their discrepancies, the repetitions, hesitations
and uncertain steps in their investigations.”33 By doing so, “all
the risks and advantages of this adventure are reproduced; so
that the reader will be able to find in them new-born the experience of a reading; and so that he in turn will be dragged in
the wake of this first reading into a second one which will take
31 Louis Althusser, For Marx, trans. B. Brewster (New York: Verso,

1965/2005), 33.

32 Althusser, Philosophy of the Encounter, 31.
33 Althusser, “From Capital to Marx’s Philosophy,” 11.
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us still further.”34 Both kinds of reading-writing and speaking-listening practices block learning and studying together,
but the stated goal is clarity for both.
The first practice, however, is not marxist, and occurs when
“Marx reads his predecessor’s discourse (Smith’s for instance)
through his own discourse. The result of this reading through
a grid… is merely a summary of concordances and discordances, the balances of what Smith discovered and what he
missed.”35 This is a reading in which “the logic of a conception of knowledge in which all the work of knowledge is reduced in principle to the recognition of the mere relation of
vision; in which the whole nature of its object is reduced to
the mere condition of a given.”36 To remain here is to remain
trapped in “the mirror myth of knowledge as the vision of a
given object or the reading of an established text, neither of
which is ever anything but transparency itself.”37 The truth of
an object is within the object and is obtained by abstracting the
truth from the object, just like “gold is extracted (or abstracted,
i.e., separated) from the dross of earth and sand in which it
is held and contained.”38 Here, knowledge’s “sole function is
to separate, in the object, the two parts which exist in it, the
essential and the inessential—by special procedures whose
34 Ibid., 12.
35 Ibid., 16.
36 Ibid., 17.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid., 35.
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aim is to eliminate the inessential real… and to leave the knowing
subject only the second part of the real which is its essence,
itself real.”39 The essence is hidden, invisible, and we discover
or grasp it in the “most literal sense: removing the covering, as
the husk is removed from the nut.”40
The second reading, which we could call a marxist reading, focuses not on sights and oversights, but the connections
or flows between the visible and invisible, and concerns the
possibility of sight itself, in which “non-vision is therefore
inside vision, it is a form of vision and hence has a necessary relationship with vision.”41 Hence, we can discover a new
conception of knowledge, as against immediate and essential reading, in which the text mirrors knowledge. Instead, we
have knowledge and the production of knowledge, the movement of knowledge produced through the flesh of collective
subjectivities in struggle. What does the invisible within the
visible mean? That writing and reading “can only pose problems on the terrain and within the horizon of a definite theoretical structure, its problematic, which constitutes its absolute
and definite conditions of possibility, and hence the absolute
determination of the forms in which all problems must be posed, at a
given moment in the science.”42 This reading is one in which
the eye does not see the field, but sees itself seeing, or listens to
its listening! “It is literally no longer the eye (the mind’s eye)
39 Ibid., 36.
40 Ibid., 37.
41 Ibid., 19.
42 Ibid., 23, emphasis in original.
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of a subject which sees what exists in the field defined by a theoretical problematic: it is this field itself which sees itself in the
objects or problems it defines.”43 The invisible is not the outside of the visible, which would only necessitate an immediate
reading of the unread. Instead, “the invisible is defined by the
visible as its invisible, its forbidden vision: the invisible is not
therefore simply what is outside the visible,” “the outer darkness of exclusion—but the inner darkness of exclusion, inside the
visible itself because defined by its structure.”44 The limits to
the text are internal to it; they represent the traces of study and
invite us back to inquiry with its meandering messiness and
unpredictable lineages.
This marxist reading does not come from “the idealist
myth of a mental decision to change ‘viewpoints,’” but instead involves a “real transformation of the means of production of knowledge.”45 Knowledge is something active that’s
produced through writing and reading. “Perhaps,” Althusser proffers, “it is not impermissible to think that if Marx does ‘play’
so much with Hegelian formulae in certain passages, the game
is not just raffishness or sarcasm, but the action of a real drama,
in which old concepts desperately play the part of something
absent which is nameless, in order to call it onto the stage in
person.”46 Drama is a scientific staging of the invisible within
the visible that “only progresses, i.e., lives, by the extreme at43 Ibid., 24.
44 Ibid., 25.
45 Ibid., 26.
46 Ibid., 28.
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tention it pays to the points where it is theoretically fragile.”47
Science is not about uncovering something that was previously covered, but about listening to silences in the content and
the form, perhaps by listening to the nuance or timbre of the
matter of writing, which is thought in action—as opposed to
knowledge in stasis.
This approach to reading-writing is philosophical and
scientific for Althusser, which means that it questions the relation of the text to its object while questioning the object itself. This entails changing our understandings of fundamental
processes, “the ‘simplest’ acts of existence: seeing, listening,
speaking, reading” and revising them against both religious
and empiricist readings, summed up as essentialist or immediate
readings.48 Immediate or empiricist reading-writing is that of
the young Marx, who believed that in order to “know the essence of things” one had “simply to read… in black and white
the presence of the ‘abstract’ essence in the transparency of
its ‘concrete’ existence.”49 It was not necessary to account for
the structure in which the text is situated and with which it
does its work. Althusser absently tells us that in Capital, Marx’s
inquiry-study and presentation-learning are again constellated.
Marx, he reminds us, is above all “a reader who reads to us; and
out loud;” Marx “felt the need to fill out his text by reading
out loud, not only for the pleasure of quotation, or through
scrupulousness in his references” because of both “the intel47 Ibid., 29.
48 Ibid., 13.
49 Ibid., 14.
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lectual honesty which made him always generously recognize
his debts” and “the theoretical conditions of his work of discovery.”50 This is a doubled reading, with each form operating
on different pedagogical logics.
The question is whether each reading produces a more
accurate form of knowledge or whether it always entails rendering an opacity transparent. In fact, it does both. We produce
knowledge, but there is always a dislocation between the real object
and the object of knowledge. Against Hegel, Marx insisted that
“the concrete in thought” remain “distinct from its presupposition, the real subject, society.”51 Knowledge is circular, in
that it produces something that was already there, but we do
not merely turn around in the circle “because this circle is not
the closed circle of ideology, but the circle perpetually opened
by its closures themselves.”52 As Lucia Pradella writes, such a
separation makes central “the nexus between theory and praxis” because “only by acting within this movement could the
theoretical critique conceive of capitalist society as a contradictory and transitory system.”53 Althusser’s interpretation of
Marx’s theory of Capital is anti-Hegelian not only because it’s
open beyond ideology but because its distinguishing feature

50 Ibid., 16.
51 Lucia Pradella, Globalisation and the Critique of Political Economy:

New Insights from Marx’s Writings (New York: Routledge, 2016), 132.
52 Althusser, “From Capital to Marx’s Philosophy,” 72.
53 Pradella, Globalisation and the Critique of Political Economy, 132.
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“is that it fights for openness.”54 One pedagogical way Althusser’s writing does this, David Backer shows, is by employing
“scare quotes,” which indicates that “the word has competing
concepts. The person who writes the word is not innocent,
nor the person reading it. They work with a problematic that
arises out of their moment, experience, and their material situation.”55 They are indications of ongoing study, of irresoluteness, of the openness of antagonistic materialism and the
communist struggle.
The Open Inconclusiveness of Capital
Negri’s critique of Capital is not total in any way. But he insists
that the later work’s method of presentation—the pedagogy
of learning with its developmental logics and seemingly progressive conceptual creations—overtakes and subsumes the
method of inquiry—the pedagogy of studying that responds,
revives, and displaces such concepts through antagonistic differences within the totality of capital. The class struggle over
the working day is replaced by the organic composition of
capital, and the struggle is not defined by exploitation but “on
private and competitive capital” rather than “social capital.”56
Capital’s categories are “objectified,” which “blocks action by
revolutionary subjectivity.”57 Even if Capital is organized more
54 David I. Backer, The Gold and the Dross: Althusser for Educators
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along the lines of learning, on my reading, there are still traces of antagonistic subjectivity, of differential manifestations
of struggle, and the interruption of studying in presentation.
There are traces of studying throughout.
One example is the very last chapter of the first volume
of Capital, which is concerned with Wakefield’s theory of colonialism. It’s a rather dry and short chapter, one that follows
from Marx’s most succinct case and call for communist revolution, where Marx turns away from the historical empirical
inquiry and presents a succinct dialectical and historical materialist analysis of the tendency of capitalist accumulation and
how the contradictions of capitalism might result in particular
revolutionary paths. Marx begins with the scattered private
property of individuals in petty manufacture, handicraft, and
peasant labor. Together, these prevent the concentration of
means of production, division of labor, and cooperation of
labor (social labor), the formation of the collective laborer
(the antagonistic subject), and so remains locked within the
production and circulation of use-values.
Halfway through this first paragraph of the second to last
chapter, Marx notes that “at a certain stage of development,”
these property relations create “the material agencies for its
own dissolution,” producing “new passions” that “the old
social organization” prevents.58 Individual private property is
annihilated by capital and, through theft, colonialism, slavery,
repression, and so on, centralized and concentrated by capital. At the same time, this produces the collective laborer and
a social process of work that develops a universal (although
58 Capital (Vol. 1), 714.
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not undifferentiated) social worker. As capital concentrates
the means of production and the proletarian class, the latter’s
rebellious nature grows. Capital is now a fetter on production:
The monopoly of capital becomes a fetter upon the
mode of production, which has sprung up and flourished along with and under it. centralization of the
means of production and socialization of labor at last
reach a point where they become incompatible with their
capitalist integument. This integument is burst asunder.
The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated.59
He ends with a speculation on the relative violence of
both revolutionary processes. Whereas the centralization and
concentration of capital were “incomparably more protracted, violent, and difficult than the transformation of capitalistic private property… into socialized property.”60 The former
entailed the dispossession, theft, and exploitation of the many
by the few, while the latter might entail the expropriation of
the few by the many. That’s how he ends this brief penultimate chapter. Yet it’s not an empirical contradiction but an
articulation of contradictions. There’s nothing indicating a
mechanical or deterministic prediction.
Why not end here? One answer is that Marx is engaging
with Hegel. David Harvey first introduced this claim in The
Limits to Capital. Harvey’s view is that the chapter is ultimately
59 Ibid., 715.
60 Ibid.
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a Hegelian formulation that proposes “colonial solutions” to
demonstrate that “the conditions that gave rise to the problems in the first place are simply replicated anew.”61 As a result, the question of geographic expansion and the production of space remain “unresolved in Marxian theory.”62 While
there are indeed important debates over imperialism and its
relationship to the internal contradictions of capital, missed
in Harvey’s answer is the pedagogical form of Capital. The
ending of volume 1 ultimately returns us to studying and to
the antagonistic class forces that animate marxist theory and
practice. The dialectic in chapter 32 may seem teleological and
closed, but the brief exposition in chapter 33 undoes that.
There are no guarantees, no objective determinants divorced
from subjective differences or the class struggle. Marx returns
us to study and to struggle, as I hope this book’s presentation
does.

61 David Harvey, The Limits to Capital (New York: Verso,

1982/2007), 414.
62 Ibid., 415.
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2
ANTI-COLONIAL ENCOUNTERING
THROUGH ERRANT LEARNING

In Learning to Divide the World, John Willinsky examines the
role of educational projects in colonialism. The educational
dynamic here unfolds in three steps: discovery and possession, exhibition, and the colonial school. Together these three
steps work to produce a certain “planetary consciousness”
that included “a distinctly educational fascination with the
world.”1 While Willinsky introduces the notion that learning might have a connection to colonialism, he never takes
this up through a questioning of what learning is as a distinct
educational philosophy. Accordingly, his responses resort to
content changes in curriculum, like supplements for different
subject areas that would address their colonial legacies. At the
same time, educational philosophers who continue to demonstrate the myriad problems with the dominance of learning
1 John Willinsky, Learning to Divide the World: Education at Empire’s

End (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 40.
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have located their critiques within problems of capitalism or
neoliberalism, demonstrating how learning—which has itself
become a kind of economic transaction—tethers individualized subjects to the shifting needs of global capital. The global
of capital remains implicit in this research. There is, as such,
a pressing need for educational philosophy to investigate the
relationship between pedagogical logics, colonization, and decolonization.
Through an educational reading of Édouard Glissant’s Poetics of Space and Peter Sloterdijk’s Spheres project, this chapter
draws out and develops two related aerial educational philosophies (grasping and lordly imagining) that propel colonization.
Expanding these same texts, it begins developing a theory of
errant learning as an alternative educational philosophy with
anticolonial and decolonial potentiality. Specifically, with Glissant’s minor remarks on different forms of conceptualizing
understanding, I identify the grasping drive as the educational foundation of the colonizing apparatus. I argue that the
grasping drive positions opacity as a potential that must be realized—as a thought that must be known—an orientation that
ends up sacrificing opacity as such. After articulating the other form of understanding he offers—giving-on-and-with—
which turns away from enclosures and opens into Relation, I
point to a potential contradiction in this division as it relates
to his overall project: namely, that enclosures are necessary for
the struggle against colonialism. By freeing grasping from the
grasping drive, I reposition the relationship between grasping
and giving-on-and-with in a way that allows for certain kinds
of enclosures.
The relationship between openness and enclosure intro-
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duces the question of pedagogical form, and it’s at this point
that I turn to Sloterdijk’s sphereological investigations. Reading the colonizing phase of globalization through Sloterdijk’s notion of lordly imagining—which I link to the grasping
drive—I then draw out how different educational processes
produce different kinds of spheres, ones with colonizing and
decolonizing potential. Finally, I articulate errant learning as
a process of grasping and giving-on-with that values the air
over the ground and opacity qua opacity to produce foam formations with attention to the history of inequality and injury
through immune deprivation. Errant learning is another form
of dialectically blocking together the methods of inquiry and
presentation, but one that shows the necessity of presentation
and the existing historical material conditions in which we engage in inquiry.
An Opening: The Grasping Drive
An expansive thinker who traversed a variety of disciplines
and forms, one major focus of Glissant’s work is decolonization. Scholars tend to divide his work down the line of his
1980 Ph.D. thesis. Celia Britton contends that his early works
were properly anticolonial and focused primarily on Martinique, while the later works were more postcolonial and focused on the world through the lens of the Caribbean.2 Nick
Nesbitt has a less sympathetic take, conceptualizing the turn
from “anticolonial political struggle to an autonomy of cultural production,” which he claims Glissant realized in Poetics
2 Celia Britton, “Globalization and Political Action in the Work of

Édouard Glissant,” Small Axe 13, no. 3 (2009): 1-11.
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of Relation.3 While I’m more inclined to agree with Britton,
and I do want to draw out how his anticolonial commitments
show up in Poetics of Relation, an analysis of Glissant’s oeuvre is
outside the scope of this chapter. I choose to follow H. Aldai Murdoch’s advice, that “defining or categorizing Glissant
could be said to be a function of which aspect of his work
one wants to emphasize.”4 Such an approach, as we will see, is
potentially more in line with Glissant’s idea of Relation, which
resists any totalizing captures.
In this section, I introduce Glissant’s rather quick division
of understanding into two antagonistic features, which provide the beginnings of a theory of errant learning. To do this,
however, it’s helpful to have some context about the overall
project in which they appear.
Glissant’s Poetics of Relation is a series of gestures that work
collectively to reconfigure the world from system to chaos,
from rootedness to errantry, from filiation to expanse, from
colonization to decolonization. At a few different moments in
the texts, he offers what I take up as fragments of an educational philosophy that can help us to both understand the educational dynamics of colonization and imagine an anticolonial
or decolonial educational dynamic: grasping (comprehendre) and

3 Nick Nesbitt, “Early Glissant: From the Destitution of the Polit-

ical to Antillean Ultra-Leftism,” Callaloo 36, no. 4 (2013): 937.

4 H. Aldai Murdoch, “Édouard Glissant’s Creolized World Vision:

From Resistance to Relation to Opacité,” Callaloo 36, no. 4 (2013):
876.
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giving-on-and-with (donner-avec).5 Both of these take up and
deploy a certain relationship to what Glissant refers to as Relation, the broader concept he cobbles together in the book.
Relation begins with the slave trade and the figure of the
“open boat.” Glissant begins with the slave ship, that container of unspeakable suffering, that terrorist vessel trafficking in
human bodies. He asks us to imagine the magnitude and particularities of the torture, corruption, and depravity the slave
ship contains even as they are, as he insists throughout the
book, literally unimaginable. The international slave trade is a
triple abyss of the cargo hold, the seas, and the separation of
culture and tradition. Yet this abyss is not vacuous. It instead
is a breeding ground of Relation: “The populations that then
formed, despite having forgotten the chasm, despite being
unable to imagine the passion of those who foundered there,
nonetheless wove this sail (a veil). They did not use it to return
to the Former Land but rose up on this unexpected, dumbfounded land.”6 This is where we get our first glimpse of Glissant’s open dialectical sensitivity, as evidenced by the excessive
surplus of the regime of slavery, with its subordination and
resistance.7 The abyss of the slave-trade is both a capture and
a clearing. We also approach his educational project, as the
5 “Grasping” and “giving-on-and-with” are Betsy Wing’s transla-

tions (see Wing, 1997, p. xiv).

6 Édouard Glissant, Poetics of Relation, trans. B. Wing (Ann Arbor:

The University of Michigan Press, 1997), 7-8.

7 For more on his reworking or “bypassing” of Hegelian dialec-

tics, see Alexandre Leupin, “The Slave’s Jouissance,” Callaloo 36, no. 4
(2013): 890-901.
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abyss metamorphoses into “knowledge of Relation within the
Whole,” which is not a set of concrete information but an
orientation toward the world. Slave ships are now open boats,
“and we sail them for everyone.” 8
The origins of the open boat are not relegated to memory
or irrelevance, which is why openness is not exactly like the
rhizomatic nomadism of Deleuze and Guattari. Rhizomatic
nomadism is a helpful concept in that it gets us thinking in
terms of relations and extension, but it needs to be historicized because the nomad’s “freedom” is “a form of obedience
to contingencies that are restrictive.”9 At the same time as the
open boat contains its origins, it’s not determined or explained
solely by them. To navigate in Relation’s waters, the open boat
needs an expansive errantry rather than a restrictive filiation,
to look outward and beyond rather than only down. Colonialism, as he sees it, is in part the movement, production, and
deepening of roots that ground identity. This is implicit “at
first (‘my root is the strongest’) and then is explicitly exported
as value (‘a person’s worth is determined by his root’).”10
This colonial framework still exerts its dominance, as evidenced by the struggle for recognition by claiming similarity or difference from the colonizer. “Decolonization,” as he
sees it, “will have done its real work when it goes beyond this
limit.”11 Crucially, this too is a historical process conditioned
8 Glissant, Poetics of Relation, 8, 9.
9 Ibid., 12.
10 Ibid., 17.
11 Ibid.
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by contingency, rather than a call to forget the nation or to
reject borders. The struggle for Relation entails the movement
toward interdependence, “but the absolute presupposition of
this interdependence is that instances of independence will be
defined as closely as possible and actually won or sustained.”12
Despite the decisive phrasing, the “absolute presupposition”
of genuine independence is not a temporal prerequisite to interdependence, a prior state that must be achieved and then
negated through sublation into another state. Instead, the
struggle against colonialism occurs contemporaneously with
the struggle beyond colonialism. Pursued separately, the former allows history to determine the boat’s existence while the
latter idealistically feigns to forget history. To sail beyond the
limit of colonialism requires both strategies.
Aside from tying the colonized identity to the roots of
the colonizer through opposition, which remains under the
umbrella of colonialism, filiation hinders Relation in another crucial and broader way. Filiation traces meaning and
identity back through roots, which for Glissant rests on the
notion that these can be known and made fully transparent.
The roots and the identity and meaning derived therefrom
are never fully known or revealed, but any and all uncertainty
or ignorance about them are, at least as a matter of principle,
structural properties that the subject can overcome. Opacity
is here positioned as an obstacle to transparency. The epistemological mission of colonialism is precisely to overcome
this obstacle: “If we examine the process of ‘understanding’
people and ideas from the perspective of Western thought, we
12 Ibid., 143.
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discover that its basis is this requirement for transparency.”13
This is even the case for those who advocate for the accommodations of difference in a global village, as those who do
the accommodating place the other within the existing system.
The ontology of transparency frames the world as graspable, as capable of being brought into one’s own knowledge
and understanding. Grasping is only explicitly mentioned five
times in the book (one of which takes on a positive form
in Relation). Grasping is only defined towards the end: “the
verb to grasp contains the movement of hands that grab their
surroundings and bring them back to themselves. A gesture
of enclosure if not appropriation.”14 On my reading, grasping is the pedagogical drive of colonialism, positioning the
subject as one who has not only the right but the requirement to
reach out and bring the world into themselves. The opacity of
the world—its land, water, and inhabitants—exists only for
the learner to grab it, make it transparent, and incorporate it
into their understanding. The grasping drive is the educational foundation of the colonial apparatus that wages a war on
opacity by positioning it as a potential that must be realized so
it can be held onto.
Beyond Grasping and into Relation
Glissant shows us how the grasping drive itself organizes being, knowing, and relating through a colonial framework. To
get at his other conceptualization of understanding, that of
giving-on-and-with, it’s necessary to dive into the unfolding
13 Ibid., 189-190.
14 Ibid., 191-192.
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of Relation, which the colonial grasping drive blocks. First,
one can only gesture towards this Relation. In the book, Glissant gathers together fragments of openings in a poetics that
cannot systematize but “is latent, open, multilingual in intention, directly in contact with everything possible.”15 Second,
the site through which he approaches Relation is the Caribbean, as it’s one place with particularly dense relations, as evidenced by one relational process that begins to approach Relation: creolization. Creolization is a process of hybridization
that “is only exemplified by its processes and certainly not
by the ‘contents’ on which these operate.”16 Glissant places
the page of the book bearing the heading of “Creolizations”
at the beginning of the section titled “Paths,” because creolization is a pathway into relation, not a mere representation
or consolidation of it. Nonetheless, the pathway is one that’s
contingently determined through actual historical processes,
ones of enclosure and expanse.
Any attempt to represent Relation would necessarily reduce it, fixing it in time and place and ultimately denying Relation. Because Relation is an ever-shifting totality, it cannot be
totalized. To clarify this, Glissant introduces the concept of
chaos-monde. Chaos-monde is not a chaotic world, but a world full
of energy. It has norms, but they come neither before nor after what takes place, neither a priori nor a posteriori; it’s “neither
fusion nor confusion: it acknowledges neither the uniform

15 Ibid., 32.
16 Ibid., 89.
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blend… nor muddled nothingness.”17 When everything is relational, each movement transforms the totality of chaos-monde,
and as long as movement takes place the totality transforms.
Relation is a realm of challenge, exhaustion, and reinvention. The open boat offers an alternative way of encountering
the world and the self as it sails the waters of the chaos-monde.
Whereas the colonizing ships sail the waters of a world that
can be grasped, cataloged, explicated, and frozen into artifacts, the open boats enter into a Relation that’s impossible to
fasten or contain. That the totality of Relation is ungraspable
and unknowable does not mean that it’s useless or colonizing
to present knowledge about it, only that this knowledge will
necessarily be in and not of Relation. Grasping is, to be sure,
only one way to approach understanding, one that gives it “a
fearsome repressive meaning.”18
Against grasping, Glissant offers a form of understanding as “the gesture of giving-on-and-with that opens finally on totality.”19 Under this heading, understanding is not an
act of taking something external and incorporating it into the
subject, but becomes instead a generation that emerges from
Relation that the subject contributes back to Relation. Because
the subject exists in Relation and is composed of relations,
the subject and Relation change through giving-on-and-with
through which we encounter the force of disinterpellation
and are subject to the structural swerves of the world.
17 Ibid., 94.
18 Ibid., 26.
19 Ibid., 192.
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Giving-on-and-with entails a radically different pedagogical orientation than grasping, a difference that I believe hinges
on the association between transparency and opacity. Insofar as grasping positions the world as transparent, giving-onand-with positions the world as opaque and transparency as
impossibility. Indeed, if Relation is a constantly transforming
totality that morphs with each movement, any attempt to render even one part of Relation transparent would not only be
partial, but would itself again change Relation. Glissant shows
this dynamism with a few words about what a language of
Relation would look like:
One can imagine language diasporas that would change
so rapidly within themselves and with such feedback, so
many turnarounds of norms… that their fixity would
lie in that change. Their ability to endure would not be
accessible through deepening but through the shimmer
of variety. It would be a fluid equilibrium. This linguistic
sparkle, so far removed from the mechanics of sabirs
and codes, is still inconceivable for us, but only because
we are paralyzed to this day by monolingual prejudice
(‘my language is my root’).20
Relation is opaque through and through because it cannot be divided into its aliquot parts at any moment in time.
There are no prime or elemental components of Relation
because each and every element is itself the product of the
relations that comprise Relation; the particularities of Rela20 Ibid., 98.
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tion are, in other words, cut across by internal and external
relations that are always changing. This does not mean that
giving-on-and-with eschews knowledge or condemns transparency. Nor does it mean that we should throw up our hands
and give up understanding altogether. On the contrary, in Relational understanding, the desire to know is driven by the impossibility of fully knowing some foundational truths. Even
Relation and its opacity are not demonstrable truths. “Relation,” Glissant writes, “cannot be ‘proved,’ because its totality
is not approachable. But it can be imagined, conceivable in
transport of thought.”21 Totality is never fixed and so cannot
be grasped, but we nonetheless can aim for it. We aim for
it, knowing beforehand our inevitable failure, aware of the
inescapable opacity of Relation. Always partial, temporary,
uncertain, and unsure of itself, knowledge is a kind of imagining, something that might and might not be. It’s an endless
immersion in the dialectic of inquiry and presentation.
Murdoch puts the connection between opacity and decolonization succinctly: “The notion that one can recognize
otherness, and be complicit with it in a positive way instead
of attempting to challenge, appropriate, erase, or assimilate it,
is an idea that breaks with longstanding universalist and imperial practices.”22 As such, for Glissant decolonization must
entail the “right to opacity,” which is distinct from the right
to difference. The right to difference is progressive relative
to the denial of difference, but it remains trapped within the
pedagogy of grasping. We have to push beyond the right to
21 Ibid., 174.
22 Murdoch, “Édouard Glissant’s Creolized World Vision,” 887.
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difference and “agree also to the right to opacity that is not
enclosure within an impenetrable autarchy but subsistence
within an irreducible singularity.”23 Note that Glissant is not
against the right to difference but insists that this right is also
recognized with the right to opacity. Just as interdependence
is tied up with independence, so too is opacity tied up with
difference. Thus, it’s important that we also historicize the
right to opacity rather than uncritically celebrate it.24 If we
rearrange difference such that it’s necessarily opaque, then
each act of national independence is the creation of a new
relay in Relation rather than the re-establishment of a former
pure origin. Newly independent nations collect, produce, and
disperse new relations. Or, as Glissant formulates it, “every
(self-)determination” is “a generative distancing.”25 The pursuit of independence and interdependence would occur simultaneously as the colonized identity is mobilized to assert
its right to difference and opacity.
The Glissant of Poetics of Relation is sensitive to the history and power that’s brought us to Relation via colonization
and creolization—by oppression and resistance. From this
imperative, he theorizes different (and seemingly antagonistic) processes concurrently. Yet this is not quite maintained
with his division of understanding into grasping and givingon-and-with. While grasping encloses Relation, at one point
23 Glissant, Poetics of Relation, 190.
24 For more on this, see Derek R. Ford and Tyson E. Lewis, “On

the Freedom to be Opaque Monsters: Communist Pedagogy, Aesthetics, and the Sublime,” Cultural Politics 14, no. 1 (2018): 95-108.
25 Glissant, Poetics of Relation, 153.

ANTI-COLONIAL ENCOUNTERING

55

in the book he notes that imagination “helps us to grasp the
(not prime) elements of our totality.”26 Grasping is not after
the base or raw materials of totality, as it proceeds with a conception of an indivisible Relation. This particular appearance
of grasping in the book is, I hold, one that has been liberated
from the grasping drive. Grasping itself is still an act of reaching out and bringing in, and so it’s still an act of enclosure,
but because of its orientation to opacity, the enclosure is not
ever complete. We might visualize the grasping drive as reaching out, grabbing with the hand, closing the hand, and returning the hand to the subject, whereas grasping freed from
the grasping drive would reach out, grab with the hand open,
bending the fingers toward the palm but keeping them separated, and returning to the subject. Grasping, as a practice of
errant learning, is an act of partial and temporary enclosure,
one that would still allow the subject to give-on-and-with Relation at the same time as they focus on their enclosures and
protections; a relationship that’s consistent with the simultaneity of independence and interdependence, self-determination
and interrelation. In this way, errant learning exists in Relation
but facilitates certain forms of enclosures within Relation. As
a result, the question of form is key for errant learning.
Educational Forms of Inquiry and Presentation
Being is necessarily a being-in, and the question of what it
is that we’re in is one that, according to Sloterdijk, philosophy has not explicitly considered. His answer, which takes the
form of a speculative grand narrative of history and philos26 Ibid., 170.
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ophy, is that humans are always in spheres, which are protective immune systems that are constantly created and recreated.
Spheres are both actual and metaphorical containers, material
and conceptual, both literal spaces like wombs and houses,
classrooms and cities, and figurative ones like families and
collectives, subcultures, and clubs. As he shows in his three
books—Bubbles, Globes, and Foams—different spheres have
different histories, ambitions, dispositions, capacities, politics,
and, as I argue, pedagogies, that can help us think more clearly
about the educational form of errant learning and distinguish
between different acts of enclosure. In turn, fleshing out errant learning adds a new pedagogical conceptualization of
spherical formations, highlighting how they are always necessarily educational projects of inquiry and presentation.
Bubbles serve as immunological containers for humans.
They’re literal-figural encasings we work again and again to
create and recreate to provide a protective film between an
outside and us. As elemental forms of being-in, bubbles seek
to expand. A new educational philosophy is birthed: lordly
imagining, a grasping that takes the spherical form of an enclosure, as the microsphere expands into the macrosphere.
This growth process is one in which the microsphere brings
that which is outside into the interior through incorporation,
inclusion, and neutralization.27 Extension augments the immunological qualities and capacities of the sphere, protecting the inside while prospectively looking to the outside. The
27 It’s worth (foot)noting that for Sloterdijk this lordly imagining

and the resulting spheric expansion only developed in full in China,
India, and Greece,
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growth of cities is an example of spheric expansion that
highlights the role of lordly imagining in globalization. The
development of walled-in cities demonstrates this principle:
“the outside world increasingly ceased to be an ungovernable
environment, opening up more and more as the private world
of the first lords who touched, explored, described and comprehended it.”28 Importantly, as cities grow so too does the
thickness of their walls. Along these lines, the transition from
microsphere to macrosphere is one driven forward by the
drive to detail, catalog, and ultimately own the outside, and in
this way works against the unfolding of Relation.
If we appreciate the role of lordly imagining in macrospheric extension, we can understand the shift from celestial
to terrestrial globalization as the logical outcome of the grasping drive. The pursuit of measuring the immeasurable led to
the discovery that the earth itself is a star and that, like all
stars, it has a finite life expectancy. Aesthetically speaking, the
sublime of the heavens gave way to the beauty of the earth.
Or, as Sloterdijk presents it, “terrestrial globalization was the
victory of the interesting over the ideal. Its result, the earth
made known, was the unsmooth orb, which disappoints as
a form but attracts attention as an interesting body.”29 Terrestrial globalization was the grasping drive internalized from
the dyadic orbs to the one earth orb. “Discovery” itself becomes synonymous with grasping, as it “denotes the epitome of practices whereby the unknown is transformed into
28 Peter Sloterdijk, Spheres II: Globes: Macrosphereology, trans. W.

Hoban (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 1999/2014), 290.
29 Ibid., 772.
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the known, the unimagined into the imagined. With regard
to the still largely unexplored, undepicted, undescribed and
unexploited earth, this means that procedures and media had
to be found to bring these into the picture as a whole and in
detail.”30
Before terrestrial globalization, discovery named the process of taking the cover off an object. Under this definition,
discovery is “an exposure of the known;” after colonialism,
it denotes “the finding of something unknown.”31 In educational terms, colonialism is a war on opacity in the name of a
final transparency; in pedagogical terms, it’s a war on research
in the name of a final presentation. Such a move would be
decidedly anti-communist, if we recall Marx and Engels’ definition of communism from The German Ideology as “the real
movement which abolishes the present state.”32
This final transparency undergirds the movement of capital across the globe. Only if something is known and delineated can it be owned and transferred. Rendering something
transparent enables one to secure a return on investment.
Maps, as records of discoveries, were means of acquiring and
transferring land and its inhabitants (That the “new” lands
conquered often had prefixes of “new” or “south” attached
to them is a telling linguistic connection between colonialism
and filiation): “Europeans enjoyed the prerogative of semantically cloning their world and appropriating the distant and
30 Ibid., 862.
31 Ibid., 868.
32 Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, 56-57.
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foreign points through the lexical recurrence of the same.”33
Despite its pretenses and self-assurances of objectivity, the
lordly imagination cannot get outside of itself. Cartography
and geography are object lessons through which we can get
a sense of the operations and outcomes of the lordly imagination’s macrospherical expansion. Artists and writers communicated the newly discovered knowledges in ways that had
more popular appeal than maps and land deeds, rounding off
the edges of more specialized discourses.
While Europeans thought they were bringing the
world inside of their monosphere, something quite different
was happening. Instead of deepening their roots and centrality, they were engaged in expanse and decentralization. This
is what accounts for the fact that the Western mass media
has only recently been struck by the need to consider globalization, this process that’s been underway since the first
cosmologists looked to the sky. Now that globalization is over,
the West is finally forced to come to grips with the fact that
the socialist, national liberation, and other anti-imperialist and
decolonizing struggles of varying sizes collectively popped so
many holes in the macrosphere. Terrestrial globalization was
“a spatial revolution into the outside” that transformed places
into locations on maps through an equivocation of different
distances and a symmetricalization of space; the dominant
colonizing cities and states lost their centrality and claims to
rootedness. 34 Decolonization teaches the colonizing world the
lesson of terrestrial globalization as the open boat sails on the
33 Sloterdijk, Spheres II, 886.
34 Ibid., 791.
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seas, on which traffic now runs (at least) two ways.
Errant Learning in Foams
If celestial globalization ends with the dethroning of the ideal
by the interesting, then terrestrial globalization ends with the
exhaustion of the outside. The fully circumnavigated globe
takes on a new form that “is produced simultaneity, and it
finds its convergence in things that are current”35 Foams are
the remnants of imploded projects of producing the singular
Earth macrospheric bubble, formations that contain multiple
simultaneous bubbles.
After the efforts to produce a solid and fixed macrospheric container for humanity fail, after the impossibility—and
with that, hopefully, the disagreeability—of the search for a
final monosphere is revealed, we see the need to reconceptualize our sphereological imperative reality with the form of
something lighter, more flexible, and less permanent. Orienting ourselves in this direction, however, will remain impossible
without an alternative pedagogical form. In this final section, I
draw together the educational-political observations produced
through the chapter to suggest how errant learning produces
foam formations. This, in turn, allows us to understand the
dynamic relations between grasping and giving-on-and-with
of errant learning, or the dialectical navigation between presentation and inquiry.
If we picture ourselves on the stern of Glissant’s open
boat as we sail the waters of the chaos-monde, we can see the
foam forming white caps on the waves of our wake. The slave
35 Ibid., 939.
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ships of colonialism in their search for the rationalization and
domination of the Earth through the construction of the one
orb, cannot help but produce a new spatial morphology. The
foam is a collective of co-mingling bubbles, as liquid film envelopes air (which in turn makes bubbles light, allowing them
to rise to the surface). If we keep on looking, we’ll see the
foam’s ephemerality, as the film thins and pops, and the air
escapes. Foam has “no life expectancy of next generation, all
it knows is running ahead into its own bursting.”36 Ignorant of
all filiation, foam bubbles do not set down any roots, rejecting
fundamental and stable ground in favor of pneumatic expanse
(and collapse). Relation takes the form of foams, “where the
dreamers and agitators are at home; one will never find the
adults, the serious and those with measured behavior there.
Who is an adult? Someone who refuses to seek stability in the
unstable.”37 The subject of the foam world is a deindividuated
subject, the collective subject of the working class.
The colonialism of terrestrial globalization entails the
deepening of identity roots as they spread throughout and
map the world, attempting to produce one united sphere by
positioning everything other in relation to the rooted identity. Decolonization fractures this united sphere, as new nations and identities achieve independence, decaying the spread
roots. The decolonizing potential of foam rests in its ability
to merge independence and interdependence, autonomy, and
dependency in shifting ways. In turn, foams help us under36 Peter Sloterdijk, Spheres III: Foams: Plural Sphereology, trans. W.

Hoban (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2004/2016), 31.
37 Ibid., 30-31.
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stand the contemporaneity of enclosure and openness, showing how grasping and giving-on-and-with can be part of the
same educational praxis. As spatialized self-determinations,
each new bubble is a unique interior in which groups work
on themselves in a protected surround that’s both common
and exclusive. The walls of the bubble are shared, and therefore serve to both divide and unite at least two microspheres.
This creates what Sloterdijk refers to as a “paradoxical interior” where “the great majority of surrounding co-bubbles are
simultaneously adjacent and inaccessible, both connected and
removed.”38 Because foam is necessarily acentric, bubble generation reconfigures foam, making new spaces, without appeal
to a central rooted identity.
This kind of generation, to be sure, does not mean that
foams are powerless and ahistorical spheres. Although Sloterdijk’s sphereology is not without political deficiencies, he is
certainly aware of and concerned about the historical injustices relative to the distribution of resources in foams, as he
notes that within foam formations today there exist “highly
divergent temperature settings and great inequalities in the
levels of animation, immunization and pampering.”39 And
as Sloterdijk observes at the end of Globes, living in thin and
transient walls is not particularly enticing for many people
38 Ibid., 54.
39 Ibid., 281. For another example of the progressive potential of

Sloterdijk’s sphereology, see Dean Detloff and Matt Bernico, “Atmoterrorism and Atmodesign in the 21st Century: Mediating Flint’s
Water Crisis,” Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social
Philosophy 13, no. 1 (2017): 156-189.
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and groups; in the same way, interdependence might not be
as exciting for those without genuine independence. Addressing and alleviating these injustices, however, cannot but take
place in the relationships between shared walls of Relation,
as “the foam metaphor draws attention to the fact that there
are no isolating means which are completely private property—one always shares at least one partition with an adjacent
world-cell.”40 The political response must entail the abolition
of private property and the redistribution of the resources to
comfort those in the colonized world.
It might seem contradictory to discuss walls within Relation. Glissant certainty does not discuss walls, opting instead
for vectors and arrows. Yet I maintain that walls are crucial
to affirming his historical sensitivity of Relation. This is most
apparent in his concern for languages of Relation, which mix
and intermingle but are not subsumed into an indeterminate
mixture. It is what he calls “the implacable consensus among
powers between profits and controls” that moves this subsumption forward. “Not every disappearance, however, is
equivalent.”41 In the same way, not all foamed walls are equivalent, and we have to distinguish those that “become foreign,
monumental and impervious to empathy,” and that “only a
privileged few succeed in assigning them to an interior of
their own.”42 Walls differ in their history, quality, orientation,
aspiration, and duration, and we can posit a relation between
40 Sloterdijk, Spheres III, 565.
41 Glissant, Poetics of Relation, 96.
42 Sloterdijk, Spheres III, 214.
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these characteristics and the educational processes engaged
in foam construction. Foam walls constructed through the
grasping of lordly imagining aim for permanence and an exclusive expansion, while the thin walls constructed through
errant learning presuppose their ephemerality even as they expand, enlarging only to pop.
Errant learning—as an educational practice that abjures
any ultimate and decisive transparency—constructs foams
without any solid foundation or final ground. The reason the
foam appears white in the open boat’s wake is, after all, because this opacity reflects the light of the sun; it’s not that the
foam is white, but that we cannot see inside the foam, which
remains withdrawn and uncoverable. Produced through the
contradictory relations of co-division and co-isolation, life in
bubbled foams assumes a fundamental opacity:
Every point in the foam offers glimpses of the bordering ones, but comprehensive views are not available—in
the most advanced case, exaggerations are formulated
inside one bubble and can be used in many neighboring
ones… For theory that accepts being-in-foam as the primary definition of our situation, final super-visions of
the One World are not only unattainable, but impossible—and, correctly understood, also undesirable.43
Totality is unimaginable and ungraspable. The bubble walls
represent a border zone between the known and unknown,
the truth and its outside: “truth is neither a secure store of
43 Ibid., 58.
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facts nor a mere property of statements, but rather a coming
and going, a current thematic flashing-up and a sinking into
the athematic night.”44 One knows the same wall but not of
what lies on the other side. When the wall collapses, something new is known—like, perhaps, who and what lived beyond the wall—but because of the collapse something else
is lost, irrecoverable, and forever unknowable. The resulting
configuration of foam, accordingly, occasions a fresh Relation
to live in and learn.
When bubbles burst, the “air returns home to the general atmosphere while more solid substance disintegrates into
drops of dust. What is almost nothing becomes what is almost
not.”45 Rather than ground, the air is the element that sustains
foam. The heavy gives way to the light. Atlas’ sunken shoulders, burdened with the weight of the orb, no longer point to
any access to truth. Sloterdijk refers to this process as uplift:
“Anti-gravity can now be understood as a ‘fundamental’ vector, or rather as the tendency that strives against the dimension
of a foundation.”46 As bubbles inflate, they move outward and
upward in expanse, rather than down through filiation. This
is both a reality and a project: “While realistic seriousness has
always purported to be and to know what is the case, future
realistic thought must start from the realization that anti-gravity is more serious than anything ever formulated about the

44 Ibid., 399.
45 Ibid., 29.
46 Ibid., 687.
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supposedly ‘fundamental’ by the consensus.”47 The right to
opacity entails a pedagogical struggle against rootedness, an
educational project that can move beyond the limits of colonialism by escaping the colonial framework while attending
to the historicity of power. The move to the air is not a move
away from the claims to land that remain central to struggles
against colonialism, settler-colonialism, and imperialism.
The Windbag: An Errant Conclusion
On my reading, lordly imagining is a grasping drive that thickens and fastens ever-expansive walls. Militating against those
forces that still possess monospheric intentions requires different forms of imagination and understanding. It is for these
purposes that I’ve offered the pedagogy of errant learning.
Errant learning grasps from the impossibility of any final
grasping movement in which all is revealed and known, constructing bubbles in foams that move forward only to change.
After the circumnavigation of the globe becomes routine, life
as foam construction extends horizontally, composing and recomposing Relation. As such, errant learning in foams is not
about growing up into adulthood but growing outward into
childhood again and again, re-calibrating the fluctuating air
conditions of bubbled foam, air that necessarily has to come
from the outside and that, after a time, will return to the outside. Learning in and for foams must be errant for this reason:
there are no secure trajectories or proper courses to follow.
One figure of the errant learner is the windbag. On a
set of bagpipes, the windbag is the skin that fills, holds, and
47 Ibid.
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expels the air that channels through the chanter reeds and
drones to produce sound. As a pejorative subject, the windbag is someone through whom air passes to vocalize without
meaningful content. This is similar to but distinct from the
boaster (through whom “hot air” passes as they pump themselves up in front of others) and the actual bagpiper (whose
agency determines the flow of air to achieve predetermined
tones, pitches, cadences, and so on). The windbag, on the
contrary, is a pneumatic envelope with openings that allow
it to inflate and deflate. Yet this does not intimate that the
windbag is without meaning, intention, or politics: the content
that passes through the windbag works to determine—in a
non-determining manner—its form and substance. The windbag grasps for air that, although it will pass before any absorption or assimilation takes place, will still give sustaining shape
to it for a certain duration. As an errant learner, the windbag
follows educational content, creating temporary enclosures
in a pneumatic exodus of expanse; temporary presentations
waiting for the interruption of inquiry.
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3
ERRANT LITERACY IN THE ZONE

In his later works, Jean-François Lyotard identified a new prevailing mode of urbanism that he termed the megalopolis,
which has its origins in the city and the town-country relationship and resulted in part from the expansion of the city. This
augmentation was not the domination of the city over the
rest of the territory such that the outskirts and countryside
became the city, but rather the incorporation of the territory
into the megalopolis’ expansive logic such that the city is no
longer a unique coherent region. The megalopolis, then, is not
a spatial form but a spatial process, an indeterminate zone that
“does not have an exterior and an interior, being both one
and the other together.”1 The expansive logic at work here is
that of development and efficiency, a logic organized by the
1 Jean-François Lyotard, Postmodern Fables, trans. G.V.D. Abbeele

(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, [1993] 1997), 24.
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principle of exchange. This principle, which the megalopolis
owes to the economic and political city, is what allows the
megalopolis to consume the city, the suburbs, and the country, as all differences between and within each, are rendered
fungible. Just as important in this lineage is the zone, which
denotes “a belt, neither country nor city, but another site, one
not mentioned in the registry of places.”2 The zone, lodged
between the city and its outside, was the sphere through which
the principle spread until there was only exchange. The megalopolis is the urban process, and the zone is the urban form
and style the process generates. While the zone was once an
unnamed yet distinct wayward and errant place as opposed
to the named and ordered regime of the city, the operations
of the megalopolis overcome the distinction through a kind
of blurring that mobilizes the wayward and errant properties
under the regime of development. If the zone was an indistinct place, it was only because of its relationship to the city
and the country.
One paper probes the contours of the megalopolis in relation to what it conquered: the domus, a form of domestic
community or common, the household, under a monad of
“space, time and body under the regime (of) nature.”3 There’s
a sense of belonging in which exclusions are not necessary.
Here, language, life, and association are rhythmical and progressive, meaning they are both developmental and repetitive.
2 Ibid., 18.
3 Jean-François Lyotard, The Inhuman: Reflections on Time, trans. G.

Bennington and R. Bowlby (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
[1988] 1991), 191-92.
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It’s a rhythm of constant and spontaneous work at the service
of nature. The child is one such form of rhythm, work, and
the natural: “Within the domestic rhythm, it is the moment,
the suspension of beginning again, the seed. It is what will
have been. It is the surprise, the story starting over again.
Speechless, infans, it will babble, speak, tell stories, will have
told stories, will have stories told about it, will have had stories
told about it.”4 Under the domus, the child is a fresh beginning
that ensures continuity and repetition, that which maintains
coherence through the possibility of beginning again. At the
same time, and because of this, the child enacts the interruptions and excesses of the domus. There can be no domestic
community without something to domesticate. The domestic
rhythm does not suture or heal interruptions, but ‘scars over’
them.5 Neither suppressed nor absorbed, unpredictable and
unintelligible disruptions are simply a structural part of the
natural realm under—and for—which humans produce their
domiciles. Nature, impossible to subject to cognition, is fate.
Lyotard tells us that he can only write about the domus
from within the megalopolis, an urban form of community that’s not based on a relation to nature but to exchange.
There’s no more memory, narrative, or rhythm, just databanks
and algorithms. The megalopolis is the geographic manifestation of what he terms ‘the system,’ which operates according
to the logic of performativity where, driven by the demand
to maximize the efficiency of inputs and outputs, “everyone
seeks and will find as best s/he can the information needed to
4 Ibid., 193.
5 Ibid., 192.
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make a living, which makes no sense.”6 The megalopolis has
replaced the order of the domus, broken apart its rhythmic and
spatial belonging to introduce a process of communication
and commerce between individuals. In the place of an order
dictated by the mystery of nature, it installs a democratic and
capitalist system based on reason, rationality, and exchange.
The system prohibits mystery and interruption not through
repression or exclusion, but incorporation and development.
Everything can and must be brought within its structure.
The spokespeople of the megalopolis tell us that this is
progress and justice. By making everything transparent and
communicable, by bringing the domus inside, we can resolve
all problems, address all wrongs, repair all divisions. Such inclusion, however, ultimately works to transform the untamable interruptions that pervaded the domus: “What domesticity regulated—savagery—it demanded. It had to have its
off-stage within itself.”7 Whereas the domus, haunted by interruptions, accepts opacity qua opacity, the megalopolis consumes interruptions, rendering opacity as nothing more than
unrealized transparency. This consumption is fundamental
to its development: “Secrets must be put into circuits, writings programmed, tragedies transcribed into bits of information… The secret is capitalized swiftly and efficiently.”8 There
is no service to mystery, no submission to interruptions that
would compel us to construct a domicile. There is no need for
6 Ibid., 194.
7 Ibid., 201.
8 Ibid.
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shelter without the threat of the untamable, and the zone’s
internal spatial divisions are inessential, being merely rooms
in a massive museum that can shift, collapse, or emerge as
more objects accumulate. What is essential is “the multiplicity
of competing figures,” which provides the megalopolis with
‘an air of critique thanks to the comparison possible between
‘good objects.’”9
Here we can approach the pedagogical apparatus that accompanies and facilitates the spread of the megalopolis. To
compare is to subject different objects to a common measure and is predicated upon according or giving a form to
something. In according a form, something is placed under
an existing category or concept, while in giving a form, a new
category or concept is created. Both “forms and concepts are
constitutive of objects, they pro-duce data that can be grasped
by sensibility and that are intelligible to the understanding.”10
This pedagogy of grasping is the motor of the megalopolis,
which positions everything as a potential object to be known
and exchanged. Under the domus, the child is both a child and
a future adult, a something and a someone. Simultaneously
an interruption into and a legitimation of continuity, the domus serves the child. In the megalopolis, the child is merely a
deficient adult, one that does not need to be tamed but needs
to be developed by grasping, through which the child learns
how to grasp as it is grasped. The child or the student is not
something that will speak (as in the domus), but someone that can
and must speak.
9 Lyotard, Postmodern Fables, 27.
10 Lyotard, The Inhuman, 140.
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The methods and contents—the information, knowledge, politics, habits, or beliefs they represent—are (largely)
irrelevant. While specific instances of grasping are guided by
specific ends, grasping itself is a never-ending process, a constant development that never stops for the individuals of the
megalopolis as we expand the museum. In the university of
the megalopolis, it is less significant what one grasps and more
important that one learns how to grasp. This accounts for the
refrain of administrators, admissions counselors, and public
relations officers: we are preparing students not just for jobs
that do not yet exist, but for an entire world that does not yet
exist. By “world,” they mean the specific internal configuration of the museum, which does not yet exist because it is
the object of endless development, an end in itself, an end
without any end.
The flexibility and openness of the megalopolis correspond with that of its pedagogy. Anything and everything is
only a new possibility to be realized, a new unknown to be
grasped. How exciting! Even the worst of problems can be
accommodated, for each new dispute or tragedy “requires
new regulations, other forms of community that must be
invented.”11 Every x is exchangeable and capable of entering
into the circuits of the megalopolis, and if an x is not so at
the present moment, then through grasping it will be so in
the future, at which point it will be placed, compared, and
evaluated alongside the other objects in the museum. This will
happen efficiently through the individualization and diversification of learning styles, objectives, outcomes, assessments,
11 Lyotard, Postmodern Fables, 31.
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and evaluations. Any gap between possibility and actuality
must be bridged by the imaginary as quickly as possible. Nothing is outside the power of imagination or the mind’s ability
to grasp. Everything is directed toward the individual of the
megalopolis, in need of decipherment and comparison.
If Lyotard can only write what he does about the domus
from within the megalopolis, it’s not because it was a previous,
empirically definable stage of history that demands a distance
for comprehension. He doubts it ever really existed as a form
of community. Instead, it has to do with the very struggle over
pedagogical relations, and the resistance to grasping in and for
the zone. There is always something that resists development:
the domus, which exists within the megalopolis as the force of
impossibility, which “is not only the opposite of possible, it is a
case of it, the zero case of possibility.”12 The way to inhabit the
megalopolis is “by citing the lost domus,”13 by inhabiting the
zero case of childhood’s possibility. The domus exists as “the
child whose awakening displaces it to the future horizon of
his thoughts and writing, to a coming which will always have
to be deferred.”14 Childhood—which is linked with thought
and writing—includes but is more than a beginning and passing stage of life, and also refers to a recurrent state that runs
counter to and interrupts development. Biological childhood
is when the human is in-human, when we’re radically dependent on others yet without the capacity or means to recog12 Lyotard, The Inhuman, 197.
13 Ibid., 200.
14 Ibid., 201.
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nize, account for, or respond to this dependency. The child
is not a human yet because there is no “I” that can speak. As
a recurrent state, childhood or infancy is an interruption in
the subject’s humanity, in which we cannot participate in the
debate, dialogue, reason, or exchange that is so essential to the
megalopolis. The child is, in short, stupid, and the stupidity
of the child is the pedagogical stake of marxist education in
the zone.15
Illiteracy in the Zone
The trajectory of development in grasping proceeds from ignorance to knowledge. Ignorance is the possibility of communicable and exchangeable knowledge. Through grasping,
ignorance develops into competent and articulate knowledge.
Ignorance, like grasping, is always active, constantly on the
move toward mastery, destined for its proper place amongst
“the billions of padded messages” in “the immense zone.”16
Stupidity, which can never be developed, threatens this trajectory. As Lyotard defines it at one point, it is “a no-saying amid
the always already said.”17 Such a no-saying is not the refusal
to speak—which would necessitate the ability to speak—but
the very impotence and failure of speech, its permanent opacity. It is only, Lyotard writes, in a state of stupor that we can
access this impotent energy, “because it consists only in the
15 For a marxist take on stupidity and revolution, see Derek R.

Ford, Marxism, Pedagogy, and the General Intellect: Beyond the Knowledge
Economy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021), 75-89.
16 Lyotard, Postmodern Fables, 31.
17 Lyotard, The Inhuman, 202.
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timbre of a sensitive, sentimental matter.”18
Organized around the pedagogy of grasping, the zone’s
museum has “no need for writing, childhood, pain” because
it is “an economy in which everything is taken, nothing received. And so necessarily, an illiteracy.”19 There is no service
or surrender to the untamable, no obligation to live with interruptions. Childhood as recurrent inhumanity and writing are
inessential to the megalopolis because they cannot factor into
an exchange. They are relegated to the zone’s ghettos, which
are not planned by the metropolis as spatially distinct areas,
but instead are the result of “prodigal thought” that “secretes
the wall of its ghetto.”20 The ghetto walls are the discharge of
the secret, marks of stupor that cannot be grasped. Illiteracy,
on this reading, is not the negation or suppression of literacy, but instead a development of literacy as grasping, through
which forms and concepts constitute objects under the mind’s
direction and the subject’s will. These traces are what the megalopolis could do without and are the reason it tries to develop
the child as quickly as possible. They are also what can open
an alternative pedagogy to grasping, which I want to sketch by
turning to some of Lyotard’s writing on writing and sound, to
gesture toward an errant literacy.
In his letter ostensibly addressed to David Rogozinski,
Lyotard comments on Claude Lefort’s analysis of George
Orwell’s 1984. What Lyotard finds significant is, first, that
18 Ibid., 201.
19 Ibid., 199.
20 Ibid., 200.
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Orwell’s book is not a work of criticism but literature. Criticism, as we have seen, is perfectly acceptable to, and even
desirable for, the megalopolis. The kind of writing Lyotard
is after is one that “demands privation” and thus “cannot cooperate with a project of domination or total transparency,
even involuntarily.”21 Orwell’s hero, Winston, writes the novel
not as a manifesto or theoretical excursus, but as a private
diary, an act that begins as a resistance through which Winston encounters his “secret universe.”22 Yet as he writes his
innermost thoughts—driven by an attempt to escape the system—he articulates the secret, obliterating it and facilitating its
swift and efficient capture in the megalopolis. The capture and
defense of the secret hinges on the relation between language
and writing, which are both allied and opposed to each other.
“One writes against language, but necessarily with it. To say
what it already knows how to say is not writing. One wants to
say what it does not know how to say, but what one imagines
it should be able to say.”23 We can only write with language, but
we present with language to move beyond or outside of it into
the secret life of inquiry.24
21 Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Explained: Correspondence

1982-1985, trans. D. Barry, B. Maher, J. Pefanis, V. Spate, and M.
Thomas (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, [1988]
1993), 88.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., 89.
24 For more on Lyotard and the communist project, see Ford,

Communist Study, 67-90.
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When the secret is absorbed into the megalopolis through
articulation, writing is subsumed by language. But this domination is never really total as long as writing takes place because writing is “one region where restlessness, lack, and ‘idiocy’ come out into the open.”25 This is the childish stupidity
that emerges through writing, which always indicates there is
something that language cannot capture, that cannot be reduced to information. There seems to be a kind of writing
that’s most open to stupidity, which he finds in Walter Benjamin’s writings on childhood, which do not describe childhood
but indicate “the childhood of the event and inscribe what
is uncapturable about it.”26 In describing childhood, I might
seek to articulate something new about childhood, to show
how it’s unique. But this would remain tied to the megalopolis’
logic of development, in which an event is transformed into
an innovation, something new that can be sold or circulated throughout the infinite exchange routes of the megalopolis. Each innovation is a child that has grown up. Instead,
childish reading-writing is about an initiation into childhood;
an unknown that remains unknown and only appears through
traces. Instead of the diary, the more appropriate act of resistance in the novel is the production of idiom, singular words
that cannot be translated or transferred that articulate that
which cannot be captured and, in so doing, never quite succeeds at signaling what it names. Because the idiom always
fails, it’s the experience of initiation without development.
The idiom is singular but also shared, a common point of
25 Lyotard, The Postmodern Explained, 90.
26 Ibid.

ERRANT LITERACY IN THE ZONE

79

contact in which we share in the secret. In love, there is “the
never-ending search for a different idiom of sensibility, this
vertigo where my idiom and yours falter, where they look for
exchange, where they resist and discover each other.”27 The
idiom is never complete, can never capture what it wants, and
hence cannot grow up into an innovation, destined always and
only to the experience of initiation.
The megalopolis is not reducible to the totalitarian system
in 1984, but what the two share in common is the reduction of
writing to language. The megalopolis does not seek to eliminate writing, but to translate its singularity as an initiation that
must grow up into an innovation. Lyotard will later affirm this
after the triumph of the liberal-capitalist-imperialist system,
which did so precisely because it was open to writing, it needed
writing and the secret, without which there would be nothing
new to inscribe in its circuits. But it needs a particular kind of
writing: innovative writing, adult writing, transparent writing.
Writing and Listening to the Silent Teaching of Words
In several texts, particularly after he began writing about sound
and music, Lyotard introduces a sonic dimension to literacy.
In “Address on the Subject of the Course of Philosophy,” for
example, he linked philosophical literacy to listening. Because
philosophy is not an object or a corpus of knowledge, but
rather the activity of thinking and questioning, philosophical
literacy is “an exercise in discomposure in relation to the text,
an exercise in patience,” the patience of never being done
reading, discovering “that you have not read what you have
27 Ibid., 92.
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read,” such that “reading is an exercise in listening.” 28 In a
short foreword to a collection of his works, which later appeared in Postmodern Fables, Lyotard introduces three aesthetic
dynamics of literacy, which each correspond to a particular
kind of writing.
First, there is hearing writing. When you hear yourself write
“you hear only something that has to be written,” are confident in the writing, “ahead” of it.29 Hearing writing is a transparent communication between sound and text, the words in
the head and the words on the page, where language and writing are allies. You’re confident that you’re writing what you’re
hearing. Second, there is listening writing, which is uncertain
writing, when you hesitate to write because of the suspension or gap between what you hear and what you write. This
hesitation can lead in two directions. On one hand, you might
“strap it down, make it severe, classical, academic,” arguing
your points against another; on the other hand, it can also lead
to a neglect of the writing.30 If you’re uncertain, that is, you
might disrespect the adherence of writing to language insofar
as the links between the two are lost. This ambiguity ensures
that you’ll have to continue to listen to the writing, continue
to write again. Third, there is not listening writing. You’re not
listening to the writing, but for something else entirely, beyond
reading and thinking through words and language: “You lend

28 Ibid., 101.
29 Lyotard, Postmodern Fables, 149.
30 Ibid., 150
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an ear only to what comes along.”31
We can take these distinctions as different relations to
thought with different temporalities. Hearing writing is a correspondence to formulations, or an immediate harmonization
between language and writing. Listening writing is an interruption in the harmony, one that desynchronizes language
and writing, thought and articulation. The relationship between thought and articulation is suspended, ambiguous, and
unsettled, but still present nonetheless Not listening writing
is a sonic openness to the present or an obedience to noise.
Meaning is absent and without any relation to the writing. The
reason why Lyotard ascribes illiteracy to the megalopolis is
that it is organized solely around hearing and listening. There
is only information to be exchanged and knowledge to be produced. You can hesitate, yes, as long as you produce something intelligible. There is not a hierarchy of values within the
three modes of sonic writing, however; it is not as if hearing
and listening must be resisted. In fact, the three modes might
be either heterogeneously blocked together or viewed along
a continuum. Like childhood, thought is recurrent, is within
and beyond formulation, an encounter with inquiry. But it is
through not listening that the inquiring child is birthed. The
child does not hear words, but noise. The words are still there
of course, but they are unrecognizable, indeterminable, without any links or chains between them. They are words as notwords, words as charges, affects, or mute matter.
Because the mute word cannot be developed, one cannot
learn to listen or not listen to writing. We can only learn hear31 Ibid.
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ing writing. This is, in part, because we can know what hearing
writing is: there are words, they mean things, and these meanings can be ordered, interpreted, and deciphered. This is the
writing of the megalopolis, in which all differences and initiations are only new variables to be named, rendered transparent, and circulated. What is an appropriate pedagogical mode
for the other sonic forms of literacy? If they’re not learned,
then how can they be taught?
A marxist teaching of errant literacy is a paradoxical pursuit in which teachers and students “suspend the activity of
comparing and grasping” in order “to become open to the
invasion of nuances, passible to timbre.”32 This requires “a
mindless state of mind, which is required of mind not for
matter to be perceived or conceived, given or grasped, but
so that there be some something.”33 Literacy here entails an inversion of the current relationship between the subject and
words. In the zone, the subject is the one who grasps words
and, through composition, appropriates and exploits words.
In errant literacy, we are the subjects of words. But words
are not there for us to use, to inspire us, or allow us to accord or give form. After all, “words want nothing. They are
the ‘un-will’, the ‘non-sense’ of thought, its mass.”34 The excess of the word relative to meaning and signification is not
a challenge that should or can be overcome. The lesson their
disobedience teaches us is our obedience to the process of
32 Lyotard, The Inhuman, 139.
33 Ibid., 140.
34 Ibid., 142.

ERRANT LITERACY IN THE ZONE

83

inquiry. Hearing writing casts the excess aside as it must present
the argument while listening writing flirts with excess, and not
listening writing allows the secrets of the words to do their
work, to subject us to the recessive sway of inquiry. To be
passible to the matter of words, however, is not to be passive.
It is not a matter of teachers and students throwing up their
hands and surrendering the university to words. The writer
still picks up the pen or places their hands on the keyboard.
Presentation, ultimately, takes place—although it is pricked by
silent and inaudible inquiry.
Rather than present what this kind of marxist literacy is, I’ll
instead offer two examples. The first is from Lyotard’s second
book on André Malraux. Lyotard writes that Malraux’s writing
is “a writing at the limit of writing.”35 Limit writing, which he
also terms absolute writing, is done under the sovereignty of
the word, is an act that “is authorized by no voice, aims at no
end.”36 Writing, in other words, is done to write, to express
the fact of writing, and to change this fact into an artifact. The
fact is an action, a charge of matter that guides writing, which
seizes on and disarticulates the written words to produce the
artifact, its objectification that still contains a signal or energy within it. Malraux teaches us this through his conception
and deployment of ellipses, on which, Malraux says, “all art

35 Jean-François Lyotard, Soundproof Room: Malraux’s Anti-Aesthet-

ics, trans. R. Harvey (Stanford: Stanford University Press, [1993]
2001), 10.
36 Ibid., 32.
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is grounded.”37 The ellipses are an anacoluthon that enacts or
signals the incompletion and failure of a sentence. In doing
so, it “imposes silence on the verbiage of intrigues and allows
to murmur the mutism that it covers.”38 We might think, first
of all, of the ellipses as an “etcetera,” or that which indicates
an addition of words to a phrase, which are thereby included
through their exclusion. While we might assume their exclusion stems from our reasonable assumption of what comes
next, there is no way of confirming even the most standard
and routine linkages. The etcetera not only signals an indeterminate and infinite number of words, but also remains mute
as to their linkages. It follows that the meaning of the articulated presentation is likewise suspended or rendered ungraspable through errantry.
The second example comes from Lewis’ reading of Althusser’s writing, and in particular “his distinctive use of italicization.” Althusser’s constant use of italics, Lewis suggests,
is the literary “equivalent of the swerve, shifting a word ever
so slightly so as to highlight it, bring out its meaning, curve
the reader’s eye toward a nuanced inflection. Such a gesture is
both formal and philosophical but also pedagogical (notice my
italicized swerve here). It is about attentiveness to this word
and not that word.”39 As a marxist teacher, Althusser is as37 André Malraux, cited in Jean-François Lyotard, Signed, Malraux,

trans. R. Harvey (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
[1996] 1999), 87.
38 Ibid., 62.

39 Tyson E. Lewis, “Afterword: Studying the Dross,” in D. Backer,

The Gold and the Dross, 78-79.
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sembling an encounter with this element to see what might
take hold if we study it for the inaudible matter of the word.
I’d add that the italics represent an errant opening to disinterpellation in which we’re subject to the passing charge of the
openness of inquiry in the same way that Althusser’s “scare
quotes” create a margin around the words and prevent any
firm links between the words inside and outside to be drawn.
While we can produce uncertain connections (“what is it
about ‘this’ word?”), these always slip out of our grasp. Set
within and apart by the scare quotes, the words “attack” the
text and the reader, as we’re rendered passible to the nuance
and timbre of the word that “differ and defer,” preventing our
identification of a word with a meaning.40
Scare quotes “interrupt” the text, the reader, and the writer, disindividuating our subjectivity. Within, against, and beyond the chatter of the megalopolis where, through exchange,
errant literacy establishes a zone between words that is neither
inside nor outside of the word. As readers and writers subjected to the limit, we’re stupefied and interrupted, drawn to
the timbre and nuance of the word, which we can only try to
think. The errant matter of words comes from that according
to which I do not matter, and passes through me, leading me
elsewhere but not developing me. A secret pedagogy secreted
onto foam walls.

40 Lyotard, The Inhuman, 140.
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4
POSTDIGITAL MARXIST ENCOUNTERS

The zone is a postdigital space, in which the opposition between the analog and digital—like that between the megalopolis and the domus—is not so much overcome as it is errantly
suspended and moved to a different political and pedagogical terrain. As Curry Malott shows, the postdigital is, as so
many definitions put it, difficult to pin down. The reason is
that the postdigital is a dialectical process; it is “something real,
something in perpetual motion, something in the process of
development, and something sublated.”1 The postdigital is
the sublation of the analog under the digital, as the former
continues to exist but in a reconfigured form or, more precisely, in a constantly reshaping form. The struggle, as Malott
formulates it, is over what form the postdigital will take, which will
be determined by what mode of production prevails. This struggle
is what this chapter builds on by returning to analog marxists
1 Curry Malott, “Capitalism, Crisis, and Educational Struggle in

the Postdigital,” Postdigital Science and Education 1, no. 2 (2019): 372.
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to discuss the technological foundations on which the communist mode of production will arise and their relationships
to production, knowledge, research, and subjectivity; in short,
the “general intellect.”
As we saw in the introduction, proletarians produce the
knowledge and innovations that make technological changes
possible. Yet we do not recognize them as doing such. As Marx
formulated it, “in machinery, objectified labour confronts living labour within the labour process itself as the power which
rules it; a power which, as the appropriation of living labour,
is the form of capital.”2 The general intellect is, for Marx,
precisely such a process of real subjection through the objectification of knowledge in technology. The general intellect—which Marx introduces in the Grundrisse notebooks—is
“the accumulation of knowledge and of skill, of the general
productive forces of the social brain” which are “absorbed
into capital, as opposed to labour, and hence appears as an
attribute of capital.”3 This is from a section of the Grundrisse
labeled—in the 1960s—the “Fragment on Machines.”
In the Fragment, Marx concentrates on some of the contradictory aspects of the ongoing development and dispersion
of machinery, especially as they relate to what he called the
organic composition of capital. Capital, for Marx, is not just
an economic system but a dynamic social and political one
as well. This meant he had different ways of looking at how
capital was composed, like those introduced at the beginning
of chapter 25 of volume 1. One is the technical composition
2 Marx, Grundrisse, 693.
3 Ibid., 694.
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of capital, which is the ratio between the number of workers employed and the number of means of production (machines, raw materials, etc.) they work on. Another is the value
composition of capital, which is the ratio of the value of labor
power and the value of the means of production. The first is
quantitative and the second is qualitative. There’s a relationship between the two, and the organic composition of capital
names this relationship as changes in the second are brought
about by changes in the former. That is to say, if the number
of machines increases while the number of workers decreases
because the machinery is more productive, this will cause the
value composition of capital to change, as there will be less
labor power employed and more means of production used.
As capital develops, “the creation of real wealth comes
to depend less on labour time… but depends rather on the
general state of science and the progress of technology, or
the application of this science to production.”4 Technological
transformations tell us “to what degree general social knowledge has become a direct force of production, and to what degree, hence, the conditions of the process of social life itself
have come under the control of the general intellect and been
transformed in accordance with it.”5 This presents or intensifies two contradictory tendencies inherent in capitalism. The
first is the “falling rate of profit.” As profit is the ratio of
surplus-value divided by variable capital (wages) and constant
capital (including machinery), as investments in machinery (as
the congealed general intellect) grows, the rate of profit falls
4 Ibid., 704-705.
5 Ibid., 706.
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(because machines do not produce value but merely transfer
their existing value). Marx takes this up later in the third volume of Capital. The second contradiction, which is related
to the first, has to do with the source and measurement of
value. Rather than surplus labor power driving production, it
is the appropriation of the general intellect, “the development
of the social individual which appears as the great foundation-stone of production and of wealth.”6 Thus, the general
intellect—congealed in machinery—he writes (again, in notebooks not intended for publication) provides “the material
conditions to blow this foundation sky-high.”7 Of course,
material conditions are not guarantees, and capitalism for Marx
cannot abolish itself through its contradictions; only the class
struggle can do that—partially by analyzing and using these
contradictions for its purposes.
At this point, it’s necessary to define what exactly machinery is in the world of capital because we can then see why
this debate about the general intellect and its location and relations is so important. In the second volume of Capital Marx
categorizes machinery as fixed capital, which is distinct from
circulating capital. Both are forms of capital in the production
process. Circulating capital physically circulates along with the
commodity. For example, the cotton used to produce a t-shirt
enters the t-shirt and circulates with it. At the same time, however, “another part remains fixed in the means of labour and
hence in the production process. The value fixed in this way
steadily declines, until the means of labour is worn out and
6 Ibid., 705.
7 Ibid., 706.
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has therefore distributed its value, in a longer or shorter period, over the volume of products that has emerged from a
series of continually repeated labour processes.”8 While much
fuss is made today about the mobility of capital–which can certainly move about the globe like never before—this tendency
toward mobility exists alongside a contradictory tendency toward immobility. Take, for example, the revolutions in transportation and communication, which arise to overcome the
barriers capital encounters as it expands throughout space and
time. Capitalism constantly works to produce a set of spatial
relations that enable production and circulation to happen as
quickly as possible. Selling time is particularly important in
this regard. This is why Malott proposes that capitalist crises
in the postdigital era tend to manifest as crises of realization.
A permanently effective cause “in differentiating the
times of selling, and thus the periods of turnover in general,
is the distance of the market in which a commodity is sold
from its place of production.”9 This is another motivating
force behind capital’s drive to annihilate space by time, and
developments in transportation are fundamental to this. “The
improvement of the means of communication and transportation cuts down absolutely the wandering period of the
commodities but does not eliminate the relative difference in
the time of circulation of different commodity-capitals aris-

8 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy (Vol. 2): The

Process of Circulation of Capital (New York: International Publishers,
1885/1967), 158.
9 Ibid., 249.
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ing from their peregrinations.”10 As a result, “the velocity of
movement in space accelerated and thereby the geographic
distance shortened in time.”11 Developments in communication help coordinate advances in transportation.
Two contradictory implications arise from these concurrent developments. The first implication is that the overall
mass of commodities circulating through space and time increases and, as a result, there is a greater outlay of capital that
is locked in commodity form. The second implication is that
there is a greater outlay of capital invested in transportation
and communication. These are contradictory developments
because, while advances in transportation and communication
are intended to—and, in many ways, do—help facilitate the
realization of value, by increasing the outlay of capital the
risk of crisis is heightened and intensified (the risk of crisis by
devaluation, for example).
Fixed capital is not an accidental but a necessary form
of capital; it comes about as a direct consequence of capital’s
logic. Like all elements of capitalism, fixed capital is quite a
contradiction in that it is, well, fixed, while capital is all about
motion and fluidity—the expansion and movement of value. Fixed capital is resolutely necessary for capital, however:
“Fixed capital is as much a presupposition for the production
of circulating capital as circulating capital is for the production of fixed capital.”12 Don Mitchell makes the significance
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid., 249-250.
12 Marx, Grundrisse, 734.
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of this antagonism explicit: “For capital to be free,” he writes,
“it must also be fixed in place” and this represents “the central
geographic contradiction of capitalism.”13 One way that capital attempts to deal with this contradiction is, not surprisingly,
through ideology. By touting itself as infinitely mobile and
able to leap across the globe at the drop of a dime, capital can
dictate a range of local policies and practices.
Postdigital Communism and Pedagogy:
Beyond Measure?
The extent to which the general intellect is the driving motor of production and knowledge is central to economics,
politics, and the world generally, poses several problems for
capital. At the same time, then, it poses numerous possibilities for resistance; namely that knowledge is non-rivalrous,
non-exclusive, and does not operate according to the logic of
scarcity. For one, knowledge does not always or readily take
the form of a commodity over which one can claim private
ownership. It’s easier to claim a plot of land, a building, a set
of machines, or a batch of raw materials than it is to claim
knowledge. As a result, the status of knowledge as a public
or private good is hard to ascribe. Knowledge does not obey
the same laws of scarcity or rivalry as physical commodities.
One person’s knowledge does not eliminate the possibility of
another person’s knowledge except through capitalist enclosure and expropriation. When one person utilizes knowledge,
it’s not as if the knowledge is diminished for or inaccessible
13 Don Mitchell, The Right to the City: Social Justice and the Fight for

Public Space (New York: The Guilford Press, 2003), 165.
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to another. Moreover, the more people access knowledge
the more knowledge can be created. Finally, because it’s hard
to draw boundaries around knowledge and designate it as a
commodity, it’s also difficult to prevent people from accessing knowledge. Everyone on the political spectrum, from the
neoliberals to the marxists, acknowledges this.
Some contemporary marxist theorists believe that the
predominance of the general intellect undercuts Marx’s theory of value, precisely because you cannot measure the labor
time for the production of communication, affects, language,
knowledge, and so on. Yet Marx’s law of value is precisely
immeasurable. For Marx, value is socially-necessary labor time,
which he called so because 1) it is the overall average time it
takes to produce a commodity (e.g., if it takes me two days to
produce the same commodity that you produce in one day,
my commodity is not twice as valuable and instead, if we are
the only producers, the socially-necessary labor time for our
commodity would be exactly in the middle at 1.5 days); and 2)
it fulfills a need or desire of society at the time (if I produce a
commodity that no one wants, the labor embodied in it has no
value because there is no use value; it’s literally a non-value).
Both aspects of value are dynamic; they change over time and
in ways that are often unpredictable and hard to pinpoint at
the moment. The utility of anything is qualitative and singular,
so it escapes not only measure but even the consciousness of
the consumer (don’t we all wonder why we get enjoyment out
of certain things—television shows, singers, etc.?).
The real question is not about measure. Instead, as Malott formulates it properly, it is “how to sublate ourselves, and
the world in the process, into a world of non-alienated cy-
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borgs, free of exploitation, building a still opaque communist
future.”14 Hardt and Negri helpfully remind us that there is a
“mistake in posing an ontological division and even opposition
between human life and machines. Human thought and action
have always been interwoven with techniques and technologies.”15 The division between fixed capital and living labor is
a class division, not an ontological one, and should be treated
as a political struggle as Malott asserts. The division between
the digital and the analog is historical and political. The immeasurable is a weapon in the class struggle, one that is up for
grabs by the two classes engaged in struggle.
Postdigital Capitalism or Postdigital Communism
Interestingly, neither Marx nor Lenin ever write about a socialist mode of production. Instead, Lenin defines socialism “as
the transition between the capitalist mode of production and
the communist mode of production.”16 Social formations take
various forms and are composed of different modes of production, some or one of which is ascendant or dominant. As a
social formation, socialism is the heterogeneity of elements of
both modes of production in which communist relations and
means of production are ascending through the class struggle.
Marx identifies several elements of the communist mode of
production in capitalism, from joint-stock companies to the
14 Malott, “Capitalism, Crisis, and Educational Struggle in the

Postdigital,” 372.

15 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Assembly (New York: Ox-

ford University Press, 2017), 109.

16 Althusser, History and Imperialism, 63.
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general intellect. “They are,” Althusser insists, “not all communist elements. They are elements for communism.”17 In the
same way, peer collaboration, the general intellect, collective
projects, and so on, are also elements for communism. Right
now, however, they’re captured by capitalism which functions
precisely by valorizing the immeasurability that some on the
left celebrate.
Marx in the postdigital era does not pose a technical or
juridical challenge, but a class challenge: how to collectivize
the proletarian class—in practice and theory—to advance
the class struggle. As capital produced the collective worker it continually had—and has—to divide us. In the U.S., the
primary mode has been division through individuation. This
theme runs throughout A history of education for the many: From
colonization and slavery to the decline of US imperialism, where Malott demonstrates that the common school movement’s leaders like Horace Mann argued that common schools would
“reorient how workers understand how to improve their
conditions. The objective was to replace the view that better working conditions and a better life are achieved through
unions and collective struggle with an individualist orientation.”18 Most interestingly, Malott shows how this orientation
informed critical pedagogy, a term Henry Giroux coined in
the early 1980s that foregrounds “agency in the classroom”
and works “at the individual level of micro-politics. Critical
17 Ibid., 65.
18 Curry S. Malott, A History of Education for the Many: From Coloni-

zation and Slavery to the Decline of US Imperialism (London: Bloomsbury, 2021), 90.
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pedagogy’s most common active subject of change is the individual critically conscious teacher acting for the many rather
than with the many.”19
To move to the many, we have to move beyond the individual subject. Marx dedicates the 1857 Introduction to showing that the production of the subject as an individual was a
historical product, one that emerged in the 18th century and
one that, as such, was far from natural or transcendental. This
was his critique of so many bourgeois political economists of
his day (as well as Proudhon). For them, the eighteenth-century individual, he writes, “appears as an ideal, whose existence
they project into the past. Not as a historical result but as
history’s point of departure.”20 That the individual is the subject of production is “as much of an absurdity as is the development of language without individuals living together and
talking to each other.”21 This, in addition to the withdrawal of
state support and financial precarity, and so on, could provide
another reason for why Jodi Dean claims the individual subject-form is failing today. Interestingly, she argues that “the
technologies that further individuation … provide at the same
time an escape from and an alternative to individuation: connection to others, collectivity.”22 As we take to social media
to post our different “takes” on events and articles, we at the
same time repost those of others. And the singular post is not
19 Ibid., 188.
20 Marx, Grundrisse, 83.
21 Ibid., 84.
22 Jodi Dean, Crowds and Party (New York: Verso, 2016), 64.
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what we desire: we’re interested in retweets and reposts. She
gives an interesting example in an essay on selfies. “In communicative capitalism,” Dean writes:
images of others are images of me. Each day, millions
of tweets include text saying “this is me” or “then, I’m
like” with an accompanying GIF of someone who is not
actually them. I convey who I am by sharing a photo of
someone else. My identity or sense of self is not so singular or unique that it can only stand for itself, only represent itself. It’s interchangeable with others. Their faces
and expressions convey my own. Not only do I see myself in others, I present others as myself. The face that
once suggested the identity of a singular person now
flows in collective expression of common feelings.23
We feel joy as we immerse ourselves in the networks and
take part in collective activity. This is a postdigital experience
in which the boundaries between our analog and digital embodiments are blurred and ultimately indecipherable. My—
our—subjectivity is sensed materially and virtually at once. Networked technologies are communist elements in our capitalist
social formation, the question is how to pedagogically seize
such elements so they can take hold.
Yet just as the postdigital blurs the lines between the digital and analog, so too might it blur the lines between the in23 Jodi Dean, “Faces as Commons: The Secondary Visuality of

Communicative Capitalism,” Open! 31 December 2016. Available at:
https://onlineopen.org/faces-as-commons.
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dividual and collective, thereby rendering the choice between
the two alternatives false. This is the line pursued by Virno
and others who, following Marx, insist that “the individual is a
result, not a presupposition.”24 One cannot understand subjectivity and its relationship to capitalist pedagogy by taking the
individual as it is already conceptualized. The individual is the
result of a process of individuation, which means, in turn, that
there’s a pre-individual stratum of reality, a common and public
space from which individuations result.
For Virno, this only “becomes a real possibility… in the
age of the technological reproducibility of experience and
the absolute centrality of technological-scientific intelligentsia
within material production.”25 Under Taylorist production,
machinery determines the labor process. “Labor adjusts itself,
in a memetic way, to the system of efficient causes: not only
does it comply with it but it also interiorizes it in its procedures and lets itself be defined by it.”26 The separation of
planning and execution, embedded in machinery at this age,
however, is broken under post-Fordism thanks to new digital
technologies. Unlike machinery, information technologies “do
not produce possible states of affairs, but the formal possibility of as yet undetermined states of affairs,” so that they—
unlike industrial machines—“do not in any way indicate what

24 Paolo Virno, Convention and Materialism, trans. L. Chiesa (Cam-

bridge: The MIT Press, 1986/2020), 80.
25 Ibid., 81.
26 Ibid., 102.
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eventuality will be realized.”27 “The identity between rules for
planning and rules for performing,” Virno continues, “diminishes the validity of a distinction between the two moments
and implies a significant overlapping between intention and
realization.”28 The forces of production under contemporary
capitalism are a pre-individual, common terrain of individuation.
The classic example of pre-individual commonality “is
the way in which crystals are the crystallization of a solution,
which is to say the individuation of conditions, compounds,
and elements that exist initially in flux,” as Jason Read writes
in his book on transindividuality.29 “What is called pre-individual exists,” he continues, “primarily as a metastable state,
as a set of possibilities and relations” and “individuation is in
part the reconciliation of the tensions and potentials of this
metastable state.”30 The pre-individual common is not “pre”
as in before the individuated individual because individuation
is never final or complete. Thus, the digital technologies of
postdigital capitalist pedagogies provide a pre-individual common syntax from which infinite potential individuations can
emerge.
The problem with capitalist postdigital pedagogy is that
it limits individuation to the capitalist form of individuality
27 Ibid., 68.
28 Ibid., 109.
29 Jason Read, The Politics of Transindividuality (Chicago: Haymarket

Books, 2015), 109.
30 Ibid.
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and reinforces our conception and experience of individuality as a finalized starting point rather than an endpoint. The
tracking devices worn by workers and utilized by corporations
and schools, for example, limit the process of individuation
to a quantifiable and transparent form of subjectivity. The
pre-individual resources from which we can draw are owned
and controlled by capital rather than people. The political task
is thus to wrest such technologies from capital and the pedagogical task is to demonstrate—through practice—the infinite possibilities of individuation. If the human subject does
not leave behind its origins as an individual but is continually
haunted by them, then postdigital pedagogies against capital
find their educational potentiality within such a haunting that
permeates every moment.
Such a pedagogy does not reject transparent knowledge—
or presentation—but augments it with the opacity of thought—
or with inquiry—thereby affirming Han’s assertion that “in
contrast to calculation, thinking is not transparent.”31 Calculation requires surveillance, data collection, postdigital personalized and customizable devices. It reduces students and
teachers and all of us to individuals via numerical inputs and
outputs. Organized around the demand for actualization, calculation produces transparent knowledge. Capitalist pedagogy is
structured around visibility and transparent knowledge, which
reinforces the capitalist requirement to eliminate all distance,
the demand that guides postdigital educational technologies
and pedagogies. “Illumination is exploitation. Overexposing
31 Byung-Chul Han, The Transparency Society (Stanford: Stanford

University Press, 2015), 30.
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individual subjects maximizes economic efficiency,” as Han
writes.32 Instead of differentiating calculation from thinking,
the pedagogical demand is to differentiate knowledge from
thought.

32 Ibid., 49.
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CONCLUSION
SONIC ENCOUNTERS AND POLITICAL STRUGGLES

There’s an immense power that comes from hearing an explanation for one’s oppression and our collective poverty and
misery. To know that it’s not our fault, that it’s not due to
individual choices or lifestyle habits but rather due to the very
dynamics of capitalism, dynamics that—as a general absolute
law—create an ever-expansive reserve army. Yet explanation is
only one part of the marxist pedagogical dialectic. The other
part—inquiry—is a different kind of power: the power of
wonder. Elizabeth Ellsworth insists that, “when taught and
used as a thing made, knowledge, the trafficked commodity
of educators and producers of educational media, becomes
nothing more than the decomposed by-product of something
that has already happened to us.”1 This is not a mere epistemological abstraction, but an ontological one as well insofar as we
experience ourselves as abstractions, as individuals. Ellsworth
1 Elizabeth Ellsworth, Places of Learning: Media, Architecture, Pedago-

gy (New York: Routledge, 2005), 1.
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shows that pedagogy itself is differentializing and contingent,
insofar as “the ‘self ’ is what emerges from that learning experience… When my self and what I know are simultaneously in
the making, my body/brain/mind is participating in an event
that exists outside the realm of language.”2 The pedagogical
experience is not about knowledge but about thinking, which is,
in turn, about thinking the limits of thought. Ellsworth reminds
us “that the very possibility of thought is predicated upon our
opportunities and capacities to encounter the limits of thinking and knowing.”3
If one side of the marxist pedagogical dialectic is about
knowing and presentation, then we have to attend to the other
side, which is about thought and inquiry. Such a distinction
turns on the dialectic between exchange-value and use-value,
between abstraction and differentialization, between capitalism and communism. The dialectic itself is here, in the present, in the global capitalist world, but in the world in transition. Understanding or knowing involves a determinate
judgment that takes place when given data comes under the
mind’s order and comprehension is a faculty of determination in which data comes under the mind’s comprehension.
Thinking, by contrast, is an exposure to stupor, an experience
with immeasurable concepts that the mind can never grasp.
Capitalism in its flexibility can accommodate and capture all
kinds of knowledge, even minoritarian ones. By examining
the student rebellions of the mid-20th-century, Roderick Ferguson shows that the university is “an institution that socializes
2 Ibid., 2.
3 Ibid., 25.
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state and capital into emergent articulations of difference.”4
The incorporation of difference not only blunts its oppositional force but also provides more energy to commodify.
Thus, the task is not—or not only—to make knowledge less abstract but to move beyond knowledge into thought, a process
through which we can experience elements of communism in
the present and maybe even forge a collective that can finally
annihilate abstract space, sound, and being.
Sound studies has recently emerged as an area with which
educational scholarship can productively and innovatively intertwine in the interests of disinterpellative encounters.
Consider, for example, Dominic Pettman’s concept of the
vox mundi, a concept he uses to refer to the voices of the
world. He defines this term more carefully, specifying that it’s
“not a coherent, organic, quasi-spiritual gestalt but the sum
total of cacophonous, heterogeneous, incommensurate, and
unsynthesizable sounds of the postnatural world.”5 It is important to establish that the vox mundi is not a singular voice
that speaks for all of the different existences of the world.
Rather, it’s a collective of all the different voices of the world
simultaneously existing/collaborating to create a larger voice,
similar to a choir—but one the mind cannot grasp or understand
because its harmony is beyond thought’s limits.
Applying this to marxist education, the vox mundi helps
4 Roderick Ferguson, The Reorder of Things: The University and its

Pedagogies of Minority Difference (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012), 9.
5 Dominic Pettman, Sonic Intimacy: Voice, Species, Technics (Stanford:

Stanford University Press, 2017), 8.
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us move from understanding to thinking, from individuality
to transindividual collectivity. “To posit a vox mundi,” Pettman tells us, “is to do two important things: first, force us
to reflect on what it is about our own voices that make us so
confident in their exceptional status as bearer of ‘humanity’;
and oblige us to listen to the sound of the surround differently, more sympathetically and with greater nuance of attention
which may encourage a more inclusive notion of what counts
as having presence.”6 We’re able to experience encounters
more often because new differential sonic elements circulate and suspend our conceptions of the human as atomistic
and, therefore, unique. As a vox mundi, the earth, animals,
humans, digital networks, and more are transformed for a moment from forms of capital (raw materials, labor power, etc.)
or knowledge sources and into elements of communism that we
might encounter as we try to experience the present beyond
that historical materialism intimates.
There’s really no such thing as silence. As a result, I proffer that sight produces knowledge and understanding better
than the ear, although it depends on our mode of listening.
For marxists, the key is to move from hearing to listening,
the former being an opening of the ear towards the known
and the latter an opening of the ear toward the unknown and
unexpected, or the “aural punctum,” or that which “has the
potential to create a glitch in the humanist machinery, when
it surprises us with the intensity or force of an ‘aural punctum’—a sonic prick or wound, which unexpectedly troubles

6 Ibid., 72.
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our own smooth assumptions or untested delusions.”7 Building on Roland Barthes’ visual punctum, the aural punctum
“prick[s] up the ears.” What is crucial is that it cannot be known
because “what I can name cannot really prick me.”8 As a result,
listening for the vox mundi opens us up to the aural punctum,
moving us from understanding and real abstractions towards
thinking and differentialized thinking and living.9
The Sounds of Anti-Colonial Struggles
Of course, the punctum’s opening is not inherently progressive or revolutionary. As a result, the history of sonic rebellion in revolutionary struggles demonstrates the tight dialectic
between inquiry and presentation, between synchrony and
diachrony. In particular, Michael Denning’s study of anticolonial phonographs during the electric revolution expands
our understanding into considerations of nationality, imperialism, and race. Here, the technologies of the electric revolution worked to prefigure, inaugurate, and facilitate struggles
against colonialism. Denning focuses in particular on the phonograph revolution in vernacular music in the 1920s, mostly between 1925 and the Great Depression. What he calls a
“noise uprising” was located in and between, and facilitated
by, the colonial ports. It thus took place in the Americas and
Caribbean, Africa, Asia, the Pacific Islands, and elsewhere.
7 Ibid., 5.
8 Ibid., 46.
9 For more on listening and subjectivity, see Derek R. Ford, Inhu-

man Educations: Jean-François Lyotard, Pedagogy, Thought (Boston: Brill,
2021).
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While we tend to think of original phonograph records as artifacts from previous musical cultures, these were squarely modern and contemporary. Moreover, they were fundamentally
linked not only with Empire and imperialism, but with the
emerging anti-imperialist and decolonial movements. He even
suggests that they prefigured the political wave of decolonization in the 20th century. The capitalist mode of production
not only abstracted the sonic environment and created a lo-fi
atmosphere, but also worked to facilitate a counterrevolution
of a hi-fi audible soundscape and attendant listening practices
that upset the colonial harmonics of the era.
Capitalism, after all, was not just a European or Western
development. Not only did it emerge in modern China, but
even Marx’s study of British capitalism was a global study; as
his theory of value was a global theory from the start.10 From its
very origins, it was an international and internationalizing system. Marx’s study showed how the interests of British workers and British colonialism were directly opposed. In the first
volume of Capital, for example, he detailed how Ireland could
be utilized for needed labor power and, in the third volume, he
proposed that colonialism was one countervailing tendency

10 For China’s early capitalist development, see Ken Hammond,

“Beyond the Sprouts of Capitalism: China’s Early Capitalist Development and Contemporary Socialist Project,” Liberation School,
13 September 2021. Available here: https://liberationschool.org/
beyond-the-sprouts-of-capitalism-understanding-chinas-contemporary-socialist-project.
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for the rate of profit to fall.11 And, of course, he ended volume 1 by writing how British capital originated—repeatedly—
through “conquest, enslavement, robbery, murder,” through
national and international debts, the theft of gold and silver,
“the enslavement and entombment in mines of the aboriginal population” and “the conquest and looting of the East
Indies,” among other “idyllic” processes.12 And as Pradella
demonstrates, Marx’s analysis of colonialism not only made
his theory of value possible, but Marx even located the potential sparks of British proletarian rebellion within anti-colonial
struggles.13 For example, in 1853 during the Taiping Uprising
in China, Marx proposed that “it may safely be augured that
the Chinese revolution will throw the spark into the overloaded mine of the present industrial system and cause the explosion of the long-prepared general crisis, which, spreading
abroad, will be closely followed by political revolutions on the
Continent.”14
During the early 20th century, such sparks were sonic. The
vernacular musics “emerged on the edges and borders of the
11 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy (Vol. 3): The

Process of Capitalist Production as a Whole, trans. D. Fernbach (New
York: Penguin, 1894/1981), 345.
12 Karl Marx, Capital (Vol. 1), 668, 703.
13 Pradella, Globalisation and the Critique of Political Economy.
14 Karl Marx, “Revolution in China and Europe,” in Marx and

Engels Collected Works (Vol. 12): 1853-1854, ed. J.S. Allen, P.S. Foner,
D.J. Struik, and W.W. Weinstone (London: Lawrence & Wisehart,
1853/2010), 98.
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empires of global capitalism, in the barrios, bidonvilles, barrack-yards, arrabels and favelas of an archipelago of colonial
ports,” which were “linked by steamship routes, railway lines,
and telegraph cables, moving commodities and people across
and between empires.”15 In other words, it was not a unidirectional top-down process of creating a new soundscape, but a
dialectical engagement that facilitated resistance through new
audible configurations and listening practices. The ports were
particularly important, as they brought together and merged
different peoples and cultures, creating soundscapes that “reverberated with sounds out of place, discordant noises.”16 In
response to the standardization and abstraction of the industrial factory—and, as we’ve seen, of space and air and pedagogy—capitalism also facilitated “the dissemination of vernacular musics,” which “together… created, not a ‘world music,’
but a radically new configuration of world musical space, a
new musical world-system.”17 It was not uniform, and its challenge manifested precisely as noisy clashes.
The vernacular noise entailed two dominant phenomena:
noisy timbres and syncopated rhythms. Regarding the first,
because they were often the result of errant encounters of
different peoples, the musics “usually combined instruments
with distinct and often clashing timbres” which used both
Western and Indigenous instruments. Thus, rather than seeing
15 Michael Denning, Noise Uprising: The Audiopolitics of a World

Revolution (New York: Verso, 2015), 38.
16 Ibid., 40.
17 Ibid., 68.
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the Western soundscape as imperialistic, we see an anticolonial
reappropriation of instruments and thus a reconfiguration of
that soundscape. Denning notes, for example, that Western
instruments “became indigenous instruments,” such that it no
longer made sense to speak of the guitar as being a non-African musical device. Regarding the second, the music’s use
of syncopation, “a more or less technical term for the displacement of accents to the weak or off beat.”18 This caused
significant disruptions and became not only an aesthetic but a
political category.
Moreover, this sonic resistance also reversed the exportation of capital from the center to the periphery, as the phonograph records emanated in diverse pathways. Thus, even
though the financial profits often emanated back to the imperial core, at the same time the capitalistic worldwide distribution helped to ignite the inspiring anti-colonial struggles of
the mid-20th century. It was not the content of the message but
the very form of it and how their “very sound disrupted the
hierarchical orders and patterns of deference that structured
colonial and settler societies,” which “were heard as a violation
of the musical order, an active challenge to the social ‘harmony’” of the capitalist mode of production. 19 The sounds
of capitalism and imperialism are not only unconfined to the
sounds of weapons and machines, but even those sounds do
not operate in a deterministic way.
At least in part, it was the anti-colonial noise uprising in
tandem with the internal development of the capitalist mode
18 Ibid., 188.
19 Ibid., 155.
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of production that brought about the need for a reconfiguration of sounding technologies and their filtration through
digital conceptions of information and communication transmission. As the distinction between noise and sound is not internal to the properties or relations internal to either, both are
social conceptions that change in response to political, economic, and social struggles. Thus, the bourgeoisie condemned
the noise of the proletarian crowds of the late 19th and early
20th centuries while the progressive movements found inspiration and a new form of collective being by their participation
within them.
As information and knowledge grew in importance for
capitalism—and hence also for colonialism and imperialism—noise began to be defined as anything that would hinder
production or that would limit or disable the effective transmission of inputs to outputs. In our increasingly “infocentric”
society, noise is pitted against information. For Mack Hagood,
infocentrism posits an ontology that naturalizes what it produces by figuring that “life is a battle for control between
self-organizing information and the entropy that would dissolve it into noise.”20 One way this materialized in digital technologies was through AT&T’s production of long-distance
telephones. In order to reduce the noise of long-distance calls
to maximize the information relayed, “the solution reached
was to compress messages into a binary code that eliminated all
surplus, leaving only the elements necessary to decompress the

20 Mack Hagood, Hush: Media and Sonic Self-Control (Durham: Duke

University Press, 2019), 156.
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full message at the output end.”21
By the 1980s, when digital technologies began spreading
in earnest in the music industry, the ability to convert musical signals into ones and zeros allowed for greater precision,
attention to micro-details, and the elimination of background
noise. When we hear music that’s been digitally recorded, we
hear “no noises accompanying them.”22 The silence of the
sounds helped listeners acknowledge the previously unheard
noise in musical recordings. Once we utilize these technologies, they train us in listening and hearing, so that we listen for—and as a result, hear—signals and codes rather than
noise. To the extent that we listen for and hear noise, we do to
eliminate it or—what may amount to the same thing—transform it into information.
It is possible to hear and listen to their sonic choreography in ways that unsettle assumptions of the clear boundaries
between the human and machine and the link between the
voice and an interior essence and, as a result, the perceptual biases that ontologically abstracted world and subjectivity.
This is precisely where the liberatory potential of the vox
mundi lies. Consider the autotuned voice. “When the voice
is manipulated and takes on a mechanical or robotic sound,
this link to the real ‘self ’ of the singer is broken.”23 Since our
dominant assumptions link the voice to a human essence—
21 Ibid., 156-157.
22 Ragnhild Brøvig-Hanssen and Anne Danielson, Digital Signa-

tures: The Impact of Digitalization on Popular Music Sound (Cambridge:
The MIT Press, 2016), 61.
23 Ibid., 128-129.
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and thus deprive those without voices or whose voices are not
heard to the status of agents—the overt autotuning of the
voice continues to be controversial. Moreover, the autotuned
voice is disturbing. When the voice as an assumed instrument
linked to the interiority of the human is blended with the
digital in such a way that, in Pettman’s words, we realize that
“there is something profoundly impersonal about the voice,
something alien.”24 The boundaries between the human and
machine are blurred and the voice of each emerge with their
limitations and potentials. It becomes impossible to tell where
the machine ends and the human begins and, thus, where to
locate the intelligence of the sound. This, in turn, destabilizes our conceptions of sound and the binary between sound
and noise. This could represent an insurrection in the current
ontological and epistemological regimes through which we
encounter the swerve of atoms clashing and experience our
potentiality to take power and transform the world through
the transindividual collective power of the working and oppressed classes.
A Final Marxist Pedagogical Gesture
Althusser importantly reminds us that there is no linearity to
marxism, and that when Lenin proposed that imperialism was
the culminating stage of capitalism, he did not mean it would
result in socialism. In fact, the “evolutionist representation
of Marxist theory” is “yet another victory, and a big one, of
bourgeois ideology.”25 We are still in the age of imperialism,
24 Pettman, Sonic Agency, 39.
25 Althusser, History and Imperialism, 121.
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and the task at hand is to fight against it by waging class warfare in all arenas—including those of postdigital science and
education.
In an oft-cited definition, the postdigital is defined as
“hard to define; messy; unpredictable; digital and analog; technological and non-technological; biological and informational.
The postdigital is both a rupture in our existing theories and
their continuation.”26 The postdigital is a stupefying question
or moment that demands we retune ourselves constantly,
which is the same gesture that Marx makes, even in Capital,
as the book is “a theoretical, systematic text, yet an unfinished
… one … because it supposes a culmination … that is other
than theoretical, an outside in which theory would be ‘pursued
by other means.’”27 It demands experimentation, yet a kind of
experimentation that capital cannot capture or enclose.
To return to a text discussed in the first chapter, one example of such an experiment would be Reading Capital, the
book collectively authored by Althusser and his students. In
his first contribution, Althusser begins by noting that the book
is a series of notes from a seminar course and they “bear the
mark of these circumstances: not only in their construction,
their rhythm, their didactic or oral style, but above all in their
discrepancies, the repetitions, hesitations and uncertain steps
in their investigations.”28 They could have, he writes, tried
26 Petar Jandrić, Jeremy Knox, Tina Besley, Thomas Ryberg, Juha

Souranta, and Sarah Hayes, “Postdigital Science and Education,”
Educational Philosophy and Theory 50, no. 10 (2018): 895.
27 Althusser, History and Imperialism, 144.
28 Althusser, “From Capital to Marx’s Philosophy,” 11.
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“to make a finished work out of them,” but chose instead “to
present them for what they are: precisely, incomplete texts,
the mere beginnings of a reading.”29 Toward the end of the
contribution, Althusser notes that Marx develops concepts in
two ways, synchronically and diachronically. Both are forms
of presenting and producing knowledge that amount to learning, yet both have different scientific procedures and different
knowledge effects.
“Synchrony,” Althusser writes, “represents the organizational structure of the concepts in the thought-totality or
system,” while “diachrony [represents] the movement succession of the concepts in the ordered discourse of the proof.”30
When only read or written synchronically, concepts are presented linearly as building blocks for further concepts. Yet diachrony is when concepts are developed through displacement
as they take on different contingencies and, as a result, dislocate
knowledge. Each has a distinct temporality, as synchrony proceeds through succession linearly and according to a developmental logic while diachrony is open and aleatory, uncertain
and hesitant.
We can grasp the pedagogical simultaneity of the synchronic and diachronic through two recent theorizations of
Althusser’s pedagogy, both of which build on Althusser’s notion of interpellation. For Althusser, ideology functions concretely through interpellation, a process through which we are

29 Ibid.
30 Ibid., 70.
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“recruited” into the dominant ideology.31 David Backer gives
an example from his school life: when he received his state test
scores. Backer writes that his father “said that if I didn’t score
higher on such tests in the future, then I wouldn’t be allowed
to go to summer camp… the test interpellated me in this case:
I learned that I had to behave in a certain way with these tests,
that around here we perform well on state tests, or else.”32
For Althusser—and this is important—there is no “temporal
succession” of interpellation: “ideology has always-already interpellated individuals as subjects.”33 Even before we’re born,
we’re given a name, interpellated into a lineage, and so on. The
ideological state apparatuses (like the school, church, family,
media, and so on) function along with the repressive state apparatuses (like the police, army, courts, and so on). Althusser
saw the school as becoming the dominant ideological state
apparatus. Thus, the content of schooling matters less than the
form of schooling. In Backer’s case, what the test tested was of
less concern than the testing process itself.
Interpellation is significant because it moves the class
struggle into the realm of ideology and theory. What happens
31 What might be less well known is that one of Althusser’s pur-

poses in developing the theory of interpellation is to agitate against
anti-socialist theories or “anticipatory” works depicting “totalitarian” socialist society as a society in which every individual will be
doubled by his personal “monitor.” See Louis Althusser, On the
Reproduction of Capitalism, ed. J. Bidet, trans. B. Brewster and G.M.
Goshgarian (New York: Verso, 2014), 177.
32 Backer, The Gold and the Dross, 6.
33 Althusser, On the Reproduction of Capitalism, 192.
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in schools is thus central because it can determine “the balance of power in the class struggle… in the number-one Ideological State Apparatus.”34 Interpellation is the glue that fastens the
contradictory and antagonistic modes of production in any
given social formation—including their social relations—together. Glue, of course, does not always hold, never permanently seals anything, and cannot conquer the air. As such,
interpellation does not fully succeed, and we can pedagogically facilitate such failures through multiple means, the first of
which is counterinterpellation.
Backer defines counterinterpellation as “a taking up and
taking on those interpellations that shift the balance of forces
away from the ruling class’s control.”35 Counterinterpellation
is a refusal of interpellation, a rejection of the hailing that
positions the subject within the reproduction of capitalist
relations. Counterinterpellation acknowledges and militates
against such practices in the production of antagonistic subjectivities. Interpellations are “small moments with big meanings: they are the concrete practical moments whereby social
context weaves through consciousness, connecting with and
composing individual subjectivity.”36 Yet interpellations are
never secured and are fragile, subject to the class struggle.
For example, we’re interpellated into and through language
but return and utilize language “in undeniably unique ways,”
34 Ibid., 159.
35 David I. Backer, “Interpellation, Counterinterpellation, and

Education,” Critical Education 9, no. 15 (2018): 11.
36 Ibid., 5.
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such as through “poetry, innuendo, paradox, neologism, philosophy, and puns” which “all happen within and against the
prefabricated linguistic structures speakers must speak.”37 I remember someone shouting “queer” at a friend and me as we
were walking down the street, and my friend responding with
a loud “thank you”! This was a refusal of an attempted interpellation of us into abject subjects and a counterinterpellation
that affirmed a different sense of queerness.
As we saw earlier, for Lewis the marxist philosophy internal to marxist politics is disinterpellation, the force of the
swerve of atoms. For Lewis, counterinterpellation is a political practice that is always oriented in a particular direction
and therefore is not properly educational. The disinterpellative encounter produces a “relationship between actors and
the world is not fixed or determined in advance. Instead, the
very conditions for a different world open up, as in Althusser’s reading of Machiavelli wherein an unknown man in an
unknown place.”38 A marxist—and hence historical-materialist—pedagogy “exposes the student to the clash of atoms,
which destabilizes and suspends any and every interpellative
process to open the subject to that “which is beyond subjectivity: a revolutionary being-in-common that is a precondition for a different kind of world.”39 Counterinterpellation for
Lewis is still too tethered to this world, and blocks encounters
with the unknown and the desubjectified subject—or the col37 Ibid., 9.
38 Lewis, “A Marxist Education of the Encounter,” 316.
39 Ibid.
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lective transindividual common of the many.
One problem Backer identifies with disinterpellation
is that “it assumes a moment beyond ideology but really is
predicated on “an ideology with certain features, namely that
of a communist horizon.”40 As a result, there is still an unacknowledged political project and orientation at play. For Backer, the marxist teacher works to produce counterinterpellation through “knowing what kinds of social forces act on and
through one’s classroom’ and helping ‘students learn how to
make interventions that shift the social formation’s balance of
forces.”41 For Lewis, on the other hand, counterinterpellation
is a political necessity but one that does not allow for the educational experience of making “the subject unfamiliar to itself
and thus open to its own dissolution through the encounter
with an outside.”42 The marxist teacher cannot make such an
experience happen but can only try to “open a space for an
encounter by setting up the possibilities for a clash” and holding onto such clashes.43 Counterinterpellation necessitates the
teacher’s knowledge, while disinterpellation necessitates the
subject’s openness to non-knowledge.
I propose that the pedagogical interplay of synchrony and
diachrony allows for the play of both disinterpellation and
counterinterpellation. It is not that the teacher does not have
40 Backer, “Interpellation, Counterinterpellation, and Education,”

16.

41 Ibid., 19.
42 Lewis, “A Marxist Education of the Encounter,” 314.
43 Ibid.
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a politics—as if that was possible—or that capitalist forces
like debt cease operating on the student’s subjectivity. On the
contrary, the student who suffers the aleatory swerve is in a
state of deferral while disinterpellated. The void, after all, is still
composed of matter as “something cannot come from nothing.”44 This deferral is a decomposition of individual capitalist
subjectivity, a feeling that the collectivization of the proletarian
class is realizable. On the other hand, counterinterpellation is
the political experience of intervening to produce that collective and advance the class struggle. Counterinterpellation is a
synchronic movement that shifts the balance of forces by asserting a revolutionary knowledge and subject position against
capitalism, while disinterpellation is a diachronic movement
that reveals the limitations of revolutionary knowledge and
subjectivity under capitalism. In neither case do we renounce,
as Althusser puts it, “that it is possible to organize the workers’
class struggle for the seizure of power and for socialism.”45
The pedagogical mode is one in which the synchronic and
diachronic dialectically intertwine as—and with—the digital
and analog.
In their application of these scientific procedures, David
Kristjanson-Gural argues that neither can be used without the
other without producing errors. The “synchronic error is the
failure to take into account the effect of new contingencies
on the meaning of the terms within the logical totality at a
given moment or level of abstraction,” while the “diachronic
44 Goshgarian, “The Void of the Forms of Historicity as Such,”

245.

45 Althusser, History and Imperialism, 155.
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error results from comparing logical claims at two different
moments or levels of analysis without taking into around the
different meanings and relationships between concepts that
apply at each level.”46 Kristjanson-Gural shows that the synchronic error results in the very notion that Marx leaves us
with a “transformation problem” (e.g., Marx cannot account
for the transformation of value into price), and the diachronic
error results in a total rejection that supply and demand simultaneously “both cannot and must directly affect the value of
commodities” because both contradictory claims “belong to
distinct stages in the expansion of the logical totality.”47 Both
errors occur when only one pedagogical logic is applied; thus
the key to Althusser’s reading of Capital insists on the dialectical and contingent or tactical deployment of presentation
and inquiry. This is why Marx himself blocks them together
and never claims to present a unified and ahistorical theory,
science, philosophy, or practice.
The pedagogical force of their simultaneity is that of a
rupture in the world as it is: both knowledge and non-knowledge, information and ignorance, a step forward and sideways. One reads the book and understands-learns the content
while remaining stupefied in the face of its potential meaning.
Counterinterpellations on their own can potentially produce
new knowledge commons for capital to expropriate, or they
can produce disinterpellative experiences in that the refusal
of the insult of interpellation opens a space for the encounter
46 David Kristjanson-Gural, “Poststructural Logic in Marx’s Theo-

ry of Value,” Rethinking Marxism 21, no. 1 (2009): 15.
47 Ibid., 28.
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with another possible world and set of social relations that we
cannot know in the present but can only feel.
The pedagogical directive is to inhabit this heterogeneity
in the face of capital’s all-powerful forces of abstraction. We
experience a collectivity but, more pointedly, a collectivity that
remains mute and infantile and antagonistic and public. The
political project is, then, to force these encounters to cohere
so that we can build communism, sublating the relationship
between what is now antagonistically divided between fixed
capital and living labor into a liberated, collective, ecological
subject. Consider, by way of conclusion, digital technologies
that mediate the voice through automatic tuning, filters, and
other means. Such mediations reveal that vocalization is a
“process without a subject” insofar as they prevent us from
linking the sound of a voice to an essence of an individual
subject or a piece of fixed capital. They produce another sonic
surplus that capital might capture if we only listen synchronically for new meanings and knowledges or that workers might
utilize for oppositional counterinterpellations. But if we listen
diachronically as well, we receive an immersive education in
the wonder as well as the theory of class struggle, a struggle that
is advanced ideologically and materially through the forces of
opposition and swerve. This is a politics that refuses to articulate a program that capital could accommodate or even
understand.
The alternative is a silence that we also find in Marx, but
what I have in mind here is what Marx leaves us with in the
third volume of Capital, which as Althusser reminds us, ends
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with “a title: Classes. Forty lines, then silence.”48 It’s a silence
that inhabits the form of the writing’s end, one silence inaugurated not by death but by the very indeterminacy of Marx’s
work, the openness of marxist pedagogy, and the promise of
marxist philosophy and the class struggle.

48 Louis Althusser, “Marx’s Immense Theoretical Revolution,” in

Reading Capital, 349.
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